William & Mary Business Law Review
Volume 6 (2015)
Issue 2

Article 6

April 2015

Lending Discrimination, the Foreclosure Crisis and the
Perpetuation of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Homeownership
in the U.S.
Aleatra P. Williams

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Repository Citation
Aleatra P. Williams, Lending Discrimination, the Foreclosure Crisis and the Perpetuation of
Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Homeownership in the U.S., 6 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 601
(2015), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol6/iss2/6
Copyright c 2015 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr

LENDING DISCRIMINATION, THE
FORECLOSURE CRISIS AND THE PERPETUATION
OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN
HOMEOWNERSHIP IN THE U.S.
ALEATRA P. WILLIAMS*
ABSTRACT
For decades the agencies charged with minding the ‘fair credit and
lending’ shop turned a blind eye to those (lenders) who pilfered minority
homeownership (and consequently minority wealth) by extending mortgage
lending products that were, in many cases, unequal to similarly situated
non-minority counterparts. Since the 1950s, when the federal government
endorsed homeownership policies for minorities, and the 1960s, when antidiscriminatory lending laws were enacted, access to fair mortgage credit
has been unattainable. Unbridled lending discrimination culminated in
massive foreclosures for a disproportionate number of minority homeowners during the Housing and Foreclosure Crisis. Lenders disparately foreclosed upon upper class, middle class and lower class minority homeowners.
The effect of these foreclosures widened homeownership gaps between whites
and minorities. Foreclosures were more prevalent for minority homeowners
regardless of economic class. Lending discrimination, and subsequent forfeiture of homes, undoubtedly altered the perception of the American Dream,
and resulted in losses of generational wealth for minorities, furthered
racial segregation and prolonged the stagnancy of the real estate market.
Unquestionably then, lending discrimination is not a minority problem, but
is an American problem. Therefore, agencies with jurisdiction to enforce
lending and credit laws must, first, duly enforce these laws and, second,
create civil or criminal mechanisms that effectively and finally eliminate
unfair lending.
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INTRODUCTION
The American Dream is dead—for some.1 The American Dream is that
which brings forth a “better, richer and happier life.”2 According to Merriam
Webster, the American Dream is defined as “an American social ideal that
stresses egalitarianism” and “material prosperity.”3 It undoubtedly entails
homeownership and denotes personal growth and progression into a brighter
future.4 Although Thomas Jefferson hailed that “all men were created
equal,”5 when it comes to the mortgage lending process, minority borrowers are subjected to more systemic discrimination and pay higher prices than
their counterparts.6
Foreclosures have deferred homeownership dreams for millions of Americans.7 Because of the housing and foreclosure crisis, a disproportionate
number of African Americans and Latinos lost their homes via mortgage
foreclosure than any other racial group.8 These homeowners in particular
have seen the American Dream slip right through their fingers and become
unattainable for many more years to come, if at all.
It is unfathomable that lending discrimination persists in the 21st century. Despite the pharaonic efforts of the Civil Rights movement during the
1960s and other political efforts to increase minority homeownership and
eradicate discrimination, there is resounding evidence that supports that it
does, indeed, rampantly persist. Discrimination based on race and ethnicity
has become the stubborn stain that has proven difficult to remove. The recent
1

See, e.g., V. Dion Haynes, Peyton Craighill & Scott Clement, For More People, The
American Dream Doesn’t Include a Home of Their Own, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/for-more-people-the-american-dream-doesn’t-in
clude-a-home-of-their-own/2014/03/01/0c88002c-97e5-11e3-8461-8a24c7bf0653_story
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/C9KB-V3GH.
2
JOHN TRUSLOW ADAMS, THE EPIC OF AMERICA 214–15 (1931) (describing the
American Dream as “that dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and
fuller for everyone, with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement”).
3
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/american%20dream (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/U2ZM-JFU6.
4
Jon Meacham, Keeping the Dream Alive, TIME, Jun. 12, 2012, at 1, 3 (describing the
American Dream as “steady personal and national progress”).
5
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
6
See infra Part III.
7
See generally Paul H. Ojeda, Albert Jacques & Paule C. Takash, The End of the
American Dream for Blacks and Latinos, WCVI.ORG (June 2009), available at http://
perma.cc/CK4T-HQRG; Barbara Arnwine, Threat to American Dream of Home Ownership Especially Devastating for Minority Communities, TRICEEDNEYWIRE.COM, http://perma
.cc/GQN5-P53W.
8
Alex Kellogg, Racial Gap in Homeownership Widens in U.S. Slump, NPR (Mar. 20,
2014).
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crisis revealed enduring systematic discrimination in mortgage lending,
which had widely gone unchecked for many years. Even with multi-million
dollar settlements with major lenders in recent years, the question remains
whether the consequences were steep enough for the harms caused.
Discrimination, especially on such a large scale, has many concomitant
consequences. The ripple effects of methodical lending biases are greater
wealth loss for minorities9 and widened gaps in home ownership in the U.S.
between minorities and non-minorities.10 As the U.S. struggles to regain its
bearing after the Great Recession, a greater recession is likely to endure
for minorities.11 The foreclosure and housing crisis shows no sign of abating for many minorities, and the fallout will likely persist for a long time.
Unfortunately, an unexpected consequence is that the symbolism of the
American Dream encompassing homeownership is fading. Those who have
experienced discrimination during the crisis are distrustful of, or worse,
apathetic towards, the housing market.12 Without increased participation
by minority groups, particularly African Americans, who as a group have
some of the lowest rates of home ownership,13 the housing market will not
improve to the greatest extent possible. Accordingly, if the housing market
serves as a predictor of how the national economy will recover, then an
underperforming housing market suggests that the national economy will
likewise sluggishly recover.
More than fifty years ago Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. urged this nation
to dream of a place where “one day this nation will rise up and live out the
true meaning of its creed: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal,’” and that all Americans “will one day live in a nation
where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content
9

Dorothy Brown, How Home Ownership Keeps Blacks Poorer than Whites, FORBES.COM
(Dec. 10, 2012, 12:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012
/12/10/how-home-ownership-keeps-blacks-poorer-than-whites, archived at http://perma
.cc/ZGS9-VG4N (stating that the housing crisis resulted in $198 billion loss in generational
wealth in minority communities); Ingrid Beckles, Don’t Blame Minority Homeowners for
the Housing Crisis, BLACK ENTERPRISE (Nov. 3, 2011), available at http://perma.cc
/6BRS-2CTK.
10
See infra Part IV.
11
See infra Part VIII.
12
See, e.g., Haynes et al., supra note 1.
13
African Americans are the lowest group of homeowners. They have a 2013 homeownership rate of approximately 43.1%. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
Residential Vacancies and Homeownership in the Fourth Quarter 2013, 9 tbl.7 (Jan. 31,
2014), available at http://perma.cc/G839-WBT7 [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS].
Caucasians have the largest homeownership rate of approximately 73.4%. Id. Latinos have a
2013 homeownership rate of 46.1% while all other combined minorities (other than Latino
and African American) have a homeownership rate of 55.1%. Id.
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of their character.”14 With the advent of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau15 and other consumer protection advocacy groups born out of the
foreclosure crisis, it is the hope that lending discrimination will, finally, be an
abomination of the past. Lending discrimination not only hurts the borrower—it has unintentional and pervasive consequences for the borrower’s
community, city and nation. Thus, for the benefit of all, lending discrimination must be stamped out.
This Article examines lending discrimination in the U.S. and the legal and
social ramifications of such discrimination, mainly the widening gaps in
economic wealth between racial and ethnic minorities and whites and the
effect on the housing market, which, in turn, affects the national economy.
The Article reviews historical aspects of lending discrimination in the U.S.
from 1900 onward in Part I. Part II outlines the lending discrimination laws
that provide guidance on the acceptable and unacceptable conduct before,
during, and after the mortgage lending process. In Part III, the Article takes a
critical look at foreclosure numbers by race and ethnicity during the housing
market crisis. Part IV examines the role of homeownership in creating economic parity. The gaps in homeownership rates based on race and ethnicity
along with efforts to bridge these gaps are detailed in Part V. This Part also
explores the effect of homeownership on economic wealth and how there
has been a more drastic decline for minorities since 2005. The effect of foreclosures against minorities is discussed in Part VI. Part VII links the number
of foreclosures to lending discrimination during the housing and foreclosure crisis. Part VIII exposes the patent and latent effects of lending discrimination from this recent crisis. In Part IX, the Article analyzes the legislative
and regulatory reform efforts in light of the conclusive and prolific evidence of recent lending discrimination. The possibility of using criminal
sanctions as a remedy for lending discrimination is analyzed in Part X.
Finally, the Article concludes that despite U.S. policies to increase minority
homeownership (or because of them), the housing market and foreclosure
debacle, fueled by lending discrimination, further exacerbated disparities in
homeownership between Caucasians and minorities. In some cases, homeownership rates are worse than those that existed nearly twenty-five years
ago. For these groups, the American Dream has become too elusive. Further, lending discrimination has trajectorial effects on entire communities.
In these communities, homeownership has become a lugubrious experience
causing some to erase homeownership from the definition of the American
14

Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech at the Lincoln Memorial,
Washington, D.C. (Aug. 28, 1963) (transcript available at http://perma.cc/6YWH-5RYL).
15
See infra Part IX.A.
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Dream. Fair lending laws must consistently be enforced either civilly or criminally so that lending discrimination is exterminated once and for all.
I. HISTORICAL LENDING DISCRIMINATION
A. The Policy and Practice of Mortgage Discrimination
1. Redlining
Before 1968, mortgagees could consider race as a factor when offering
mortgages.16 In fact, the U.S. government openly endorsed considering racial
factors when considering whether to insure mortgages under the Fair Housing
Administration until the 1950s.17 In the first two-thirds of the 20th Century,
if a borrower was a minority or lived in a minority neighborhood, his application would likely be denied.18 Lenders believed that loans to these borrowers or in these areas would create an unacceptable risk of default.19 The
practice of blanket denial is known as redlining.20
Sociologist John McKnight popularized the term “redlining” in the
1960s.21 McKnight discussed the lender practice of literally marking red
lines around areas where lenders would not be willing to make loans.22 The
practice of redlining actually existed in the 1930s. Congress created the Home
Owners’ Loan Corporation, a government sponsored corporation, as a part
of the New Deal in response to President Franklin Roosevelt’s insistence
that Congress enact legislation that “(1) protect[ed] the small home owner
from foreclosure; (2) relieve[d] him of part ‘of the burden of excessive
interest and principal payments incurred during the period of higher values
and higher earning power’; and (3) declare[d] that it was a national policy
to protect home ownership.”23 Redlining occurred when the Home Owners’
16
Derek S. Hyra, Gregory D. Squires, Robert N. Renner, & David S. Kirk, Metropolitan
Segregation and the Subprime Lending Crisis, 23 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 177, 180 (2013).
17
FED. HOUSING ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL 978–980 (1938); see also CHRISTY
ROGERS & JOHN A. POWELL, WHERE CREDIT IS DUE: BRINGING EQUITY TO CREDIT AND
HOUSING AFTER THE MARKET MELTDOWN 144 (2013).
18
Hyra et al., supra note 16, at 180.
19
Id.
20
Id. (quoting Benjamin Howell, Exploiting Race and Space: Consequential Subprime
Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94 CAL. L. REV. 101, 107 (2006)).
21
GARY GIROUX, BUSINESS SCANDALS, CORRUPTION, AND REFORM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
487 (2013). Redlining refers to the fact that African American areas were encoded in red
so that lenders could avoid lending or limit lending to those areas. ROGERS & POWELL,
supra note 17.
22
ROGERS & POWELL, supra note 17.
23
C. LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOME OWNERS’ LOAN CORPORATION 9 (1951), available at http://perma.cc/69ST-AQ2V.
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Loan Corporation used color-coded maps to delineate areas to which it would
lend.24 Thus, beginning in the 1930s, a national homeownership program
became an implement of spatial exclusion and inequality which, at the same
time, sustained and perpetuated homeownership disparity and economic
inequality for minorities.25
2. Reverse Redlining
Reverse redlining occurs when a lender particularly targets minority
consumers, charging them more than would be charged to a similarly situated
non-minority consumer.26 Before the prohibition of such discrimination,
the practice of redlining mostly affected African Americans in predominantly African American communities.27 The result of reverse redlining left
the door open for other, often more predatory, lenders to service those areas
excluded from the prime mortgage market.28 Predatory lenders distributed
their products and further depressed minority communities, which created
continuous cycles of poverty and debt, instead of cycles of wealth.29 Again,
the ramifications of such practices are still being felt today, despite the
mechanisms in place that prohibit such behaviors.
3. Predatory Lending
Predatory lending is broad and includes:
a syndrome of abusive loan terms or practices that involve one or more
of the following five problems: (1) loans structured to result in seriously
disproportionate net harm to borrowers; (2) harmful rent seeking; (3) loans
involving fraud or deceptive practices; (4) other forms of lack of transparency in loans that are not actionable as fraud; and (5) loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress.30

24

Howell, supra note 20, at 107–08; see also UNDERWRITING MANUAL, supra note 17.
See Kenneth T. Jackson, Race, Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal: The Home
Owners Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration, 6 J. URBAN HISTORY
419, 430 (1980).
26
Michael Powell, Bank Accused of Pushing Mortgage Deals on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES
(June 6, 2009).
27
Bill Dedman, The Color of Money, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 1, 1988; Barbara
Ehrenreich & Dedrick Muhammad, The Recession’s Racial Divide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2009.
28
Gregory D. Squires, Predatory Lending: Redlining in Reverse, 139 SHELTERFORCE
ONLINE (Jan./Feb. 2005), http://www.shelterforce.com/online/issues/139/redlining.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/D8GP-AT9M.
29
Id.
30
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2002).
25
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Predatory lending is typically comprised of one or more of the following
actions: (1) interest rates significantly higher (the number of percentage
points varies but usually falls within 5–8 percent) than Treasury securities
of comparable maturities; (2) long prepayment penalty periods, especially
those lasting three years or more; (3) balloon payments; (4) excessively high
points or fees; (5) lending based on borrowers’ asset values rather than abilities to repay; (6) frequent refinancing (“flipping”) without financial benefit
for borrowers; (7) steering customers who qualify for lower-cost credit into
higher-cost loans; (8) insufficient disclosure of the costs or risks associated
with a loan; (9) inflated appraisals or income figures.31
Mortgages are divided into two classes: prime and subprime.32 Subprime
mortgages contain higher interest rates and fees.33 They are intended to open
the door to homeownership for individuals with marginal creditworthiness.34
Borrowers paid higher rates because the risks for default were considered
much greater.35 With subprime mortgages, borrowers also pay higher upfront
and continuing costs than borrowers with prime mortgages.36 As it was
historically, a large majority of African American and Latino borrowers were
the main recipients of subprime mortgages,37 showing an imbalance in mortgage lending markets.
It was widely reported that subprime mortgages caused the housing market bubble to burst.38 Many argued that, in an effort to fulfill a minority
mortgage quota, lenders lowered their lending standards.39 These lower lending standards created higher cost mortgages that borrowers could not afford.40
31

Id. For a more complete list of predatory lending practices, see generally Patricia
Sturdevant & William J. Brennan, Jr., A Catalogue of Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices,
5 CONSUMER ADVOC. 36 (Nov./Dec. 1999).
32
Rajdeep Sengupta & William R. Emmons, What is Subprime Lending?, FED. RES.
BANK OF ST. LOUIS (2007), available at http://perma.cc/8YVA-TA7V.
33
Id.
34
Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the
Subprime Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 31 (Jan./Feb. 2006).
35
Id. at 31–32 (stating that subprime mortgages are “simultaneously viewed as having
great promise and great peril”).
36
Id. at 32. Upfront costs are application, appraisal, and origination fees. Id. Continuing costs are mortgage insurance, principle, interest and late payments, and property
taxes. Id.
37
Gregory D. Squires, Derek S. Hyra & Robert N. Renner, Segregation and the Subprime Lending Crisis, Presented at 2009 Federal Reserve System Community Affairs
Research Conference, Washington, D.C., at 3 (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://perma
.cc/D29W-ECVW.
38
Thayer Watkins, The Nature and Origins of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, SAN
JOSE ST. U. DEP’T. ECON., http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/subprime.htm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/N42C-2QUS.
39
Id.
40
Id.
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Over time, lenders were originating these mortgages without regard to the
affordability of the mortgages and passed the risk of these mortgages onto
unsuspecting or irresponsible third party investors.41
The above is only partially true. It is an accurate assessment that lenders placed some borrowers into subprime mortgages when they should not
have received these mortgages. However, the rationale behind this statement is different than asserted. The reason that the borrowers should not
have received subprime mortgages was not because they could not afford the
mortgages, but because some of them were qualified for and should have
received lower cost or prime mortgages.42 Although lenders during the
foreclosure crisis did not actually draw red lines around minority neighborhoods and forbid lending in certain areas, that is, reverse redlining, they
effectively imagined such circles when determining fees and interest rates,
which is just as reprehensible. Had these lenders not discriminated against
certain borrowers, many of these borrowers likely could have afforded and
kept their homes. The gamble of discriminating in loan originations came
at a hefty cost for these borrowers. Furthermore, the economic consequences
will likely be felt for generations.
B. All Things Being Equal Yet Unequal
More than forty years have elapsed since the enactment of the Fair
Housing Act and many minorities are still under the scourge of lending discrimination when purchasing a home.43 The disturbing fact is that federal
agencies possessed knowledge that lenders engaged in lending discrimination
before 2005 when lenders increased originations of subprime mortgages.44
41

Id.
See infra Part VII. For example, Asst. U.S. Attorney General Thomas Perez, in his
2012 report to Congress, highlighted a story of an eighty-year-old African-American resident in the Baltimore area. She had a 714 credit score and good credit file. However, she
received a subprime loan and did not realize that she could have qualified for a prime loan.
She did not realize that she had a subprime loan that came with an adjustable interest rate.
She discovered she had a subprime loan only after her interest rate jumped two years later.
THOMAS E. PEREZ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 2012 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS (2013), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/ecoareport
2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7TYS-MUR6.
43
See, e.g., Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Wen Li & Keith S. Ernst, Foreclosures by
Race and Ethnicity: The Demographics of a Crisis, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 1,
11 (June 18, 2010), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analy
sis/foreclosures-by-race-and-ethnicity.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8TU7-ESRS.
44
Most of the offending subprime mortgages originated between 2005 and 2008. Id.
at 7–8 (noting that an estimated 7.9% of African Americans and 7.7% of Latinos who
purchased or refinanced their homes between 2005 and 2008 lost their homes by foreclosure between 2007 and 2009).
42
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In 2000, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
instituted several studies that researched whether minority communities,
compared with other similarly situated non-minority communities, received a
disproportionately larger share of subprime mortgages.45 HUD commissioned studies in Atlanta, New York, Boston, and Baltimore.46 “[E]ven after
controlling for the community’s income level, African American areas had a
higher proportion of subprime loans. The evidence from these cities suggests
lenders were inappropriately targeting minority neighborhoods or subprime
lenders were serving areas that prime lenders neglected.”47
In 2002, HUD conducted studies in Los Angeles and Chicago.48 Posing
as prospective homebuyers, individuals with equal financial backgrounds
sought information related to the mortgage lending process.49 The studies
in Los Angeles and Chicago showed that the “posers” were treated equally
most of the time, but when there was a disparity, the person of color was
treated less fairly.50 While the laws that prohibit discrimination have been
in place for over forty years, lending discrimination is still an issue. However, plaintiffs have had a difficult time substantiating lending discrimination in court.
II. LENDING DISCRIMINATION LAWS
Lending discrimination may occur at any phase in the mortgage lending
process. The lending phases are: (1) advertisement and outreach by lending
institutions;51 (2) responses to pre-application inquiry from prospective borrowers;52 (3) approval or denial of loan applications;53 (4) determination of
terms and conditions of mortgage loans;54 and (5) loan administration.55
A. The Fair Housing Act
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act)56 prohibits
lending discrimination. Under the Fair Housing Act, it is unlawful to refuse to
45

Squires et al., supra note 37, at 7.
Id.
47
Id. at 7–8.
48
MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL: A PAIRED TESTING STUDY OF MORTGAGE LENDING INSTITUTIONS (Apr. 2002), available at http://perma
.cc/TW7J-9FBC.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (1968).
46
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grant a residential mortgage loan or provide information regarding mortgage loans, impose different terms or conditions on a loan, discriminate in
appraisals, refuse to purchase a loan, or set different terms or conditions
for purchasing a loan based on an applicant’s race, color, national origin,
religion, sex, familial status or disability.57
As previously stated, it is generally believed that subprime lending was
one of the major factors in creating the real estate market breakdown.58
Racial minorities received different terms and higher fees, such as subprime
or high cost mortgages, than similarly situated Caucasians. In 2006, an
estimated 53.7% of African American and 46.6% of Latino recipients received subprime mortgage loans, whereas only 17.7% of Caucasian mortgage recipients received subprime mortgage loans.59 Additionally, in areas
where the borrowing community was at least 80% minority, approximately
47% of borrowers had subprime mortgages according to census tracts.60
On the other hand, in a predominantly Caucasian community, only 22% of
borrowers had high cost mortgage loans.61 The data show dissimilarities
based on which communities’ borrowers obtain high cost mortgages and
which are more likely offered prime mortgages.62 Hence, there appears to
be a stratified lending system in which the location of the borrower plays an
important role in dictating mortgage terms.
Both the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and HUD have the right to
pursue discrimination claims under the Fair Housing Act.63 An individual
also has a private right of action under the Fair Housing Act; however, he
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.64 To establish a prima
facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had
outwardly biased practices or policies that had a significantly adverse or
disproportionate effect on members of a protected class when implemented.65
Disparate treatment can be proved in many ways. A plaintiff can show
overt evidence of disparate treatment, comparative evidence of disparate
57

42 U.S.C. § 3604 (a)–(e) (2012).
Hyra et al., supra note 16, at 177 (“Unsustainable high-cost lending was a major
contributor to one of the worst financial crises in U.S. History.”).
59
Squires et al., supra note 37, at 3.
60
Hyra et al., supra note 16, at 178.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 187, 190.
63
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FAIR HOUSING ACT ENFORCEMENT, http://
portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/enforcement
(last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Q3RH-D9NP; U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FAIR HOUSING ACT, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/housing_coverage.php
(last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GP7R-C6EU.
64
See Tex. Dep’t of Comty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–55 (1981).
65
McCullough v. Town of Milan, No. 12–4574–CV., 2014 WL 1189868, at *2 (N.Y.
2014).
58
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treatment, or evidence of disparate impact.66 Overt lending discrimination
is found when a plaintiff produces evidence that the lender explicitly discriminated using the prohibited factors.67 This type of discrimination may
exist even if the lender does not act upon the discrimination, but expresses
a discriminatory preference.68 To establish a prima facie case of overt
disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that the lender possessed animus
against a particular protected group, which was a significant factor in the
lender’s adverse decision.69
Disparate treatment occurs when a lender treats a credit applicant differently on the basis of one of the prohibited factors. Showing that, beyond
the difference in treatment, the treatment was motivated by prejudice or
by conscious intention to discriminate against a person is not required.
Different treatment is considered by courts to be intentional discrimination because the difference in treatment on a prohibited basis has no
credible, nondiscriminatory explanation.70

An example of disparate treatment is redlining because “a lender provides unequal access to credit, or unequal terms of credit, because of the race,
color, national origin, or other prohibited characteristic(s) of the residents
of the area in which the credit seeker resides ... or in which the residential
property to be mortgaged is located.”71
B. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
In addition to the Fair Housing Act, Congress enacted the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA).72 The ECOA was amended in 1976 and prohibits discrimination based on sex, national origin, race, color, religion, and age,
66

Id.; see also Munoz v. Int’l Home Capital Corp., No. C 03-01099, 2004 WL
3086907, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Barkley v. Olympia Mortg. Co., 2007 WL 2437810, at
*14 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
67
FED. RESERVE BD., FEDERAL FAIR LENDING REGULATIONS AND STATUTES OVERVIEW,
available at http://perma.cc/A4E9-DDK5. The Federal Reserve Board provided the following age discrimination example: “A lender offers a credit card with a limit of up to $750
for applicants age 21–30 and $1,500 for applicants over 30.” Id.
68
Id. Again, the Federal Reserve Board provided an example of expressly overt disparate treatment. If a mortgage lender said, “[w]e do not like to make home mortgages to
Native Americans, but the law says that we may not discriminate and we have to comply
with the law.” Id.
69
McCullough, 2014 WL 1189868, at *1.
70
FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 67, at 2.
71
Id. It is important to note that redlining violates both the Fair Housing Act and ECOA.
72
15 U.S.C. § 1691 (a)–(e) (1992).
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inter alia.73 The ECOA bars discrimination based on the prohibited factors
related to any feature of a transaction that involves the extension of credit,
whether residential or commercial.74
Under both the Fair Housing Act and the ECOA, a mortgage lender may
not put off or redirect applicants upon inquiring about or applying for
credit;75 alter an applicant’s terms of credit, such as the interest rate, type
of loan, or amount of credit extended;76 use dissimilar criteria in determining to extend credit;77 use different standards in evaluating an applicant’s
collateral;78 or treat a mortgagor disparately in relation to servicing a loan
or pursuing default remedies.79 Furthermore, a mortgage lender may not
verbally or in writing express a preference or “indicate that it will treat applicants differently” based on the prohibited factors.80
In addition to the characteristics of the applicant, a mortgage lender
may not discriminate in the extension of credit based on the characteristics
of any “person associated with an applicant, prospective applicant, or borrower (for example, a co-applicant, spouse, business partner, or live-in
aide)”;81 or make a decision to discriminate based on the location of the
neighborhood or area where the property to be financed is located.82 The
prohibited actions are non-exhaustive and unlimited. A court may find evidence of discrimination upon finding that the mortgage lender disparately
treated applicants or borrowers based on any of the prohibited factors.83
III. U.S. HOMEOWNERSHIP BY RACE AND ETHNICITY
A. The Data
1. Early–Mid 20th Century (1900–1970)
For the past century, overall U.S. homeownership rates have erratically jumped upwards and downwards. Prior to 1950, a great majority of
73
Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251
(1976). Other prohibited factors included marital status and consideration that any part of
the applicant’s income was derived from public assistance. CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK, FAIR LENDING OVERVIEW 1 (Jan. 2006), available at http://perma .cc/9X42-FHH6.
74
CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK, supra note 73.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Frederic S. Schwartz, The Fair Housing Act and ‘Discriminatory Effect’: A New
Perspective, 11 NOVA L. REV. 71 (1987).
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Americans rented their homes rather than purchased them.84 However, during
the first forty years of the 20th Century, homeownership rates slightly increased until the threat of war in 1940.85 By 1950, the homeownership rate
had significantly increased to more than half of all Americans.86 The uptick
in homeownership rates again grew in both 1960 and 1970 to 61.9% and
62.9% respectively.87
The total population and racial diversity also increased in the U.S. during this period. Between 1900 and 1970, the U.S. population increased from
76 million to 203.2 million.88 One out of eight Americans was of a race other
than Caucasian in 1900.89 By comparison, in 2000, one out of four Americans was a race other than Caucasian.90
The data on homeownership by race and ethnicity is not readily available for the early 20th Century, especially for non-Caucasian and non-African
American homeowners. However, less than 1% of the population in the early
20th Century was a race other than Caucasian or African American.91 The
available data also reveal that less than 20% of all African Americans owned
their homes during this period.92
By 1930, the number of African American homeowners had grown to
28% compared to 43.6% nationally.93 In the 1930s, it was reported that
more than two-thirds of African Americans earned less than the minimum
income, $1,500 a year, to finance a home along with all other necessities.94
However, the advent of African American Building & Loans somewhat
helped to increase the number of African American homeowners.95 The gap
84

FRANK HOBBS & NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN
20TH CENTURY, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS 115 (2002). The following is the
percentage of homeownership rates by decade from 1900–1970: 46.5% in 1900, 45.9% in
1910, 45.6% in 1920, 47.8% in 1930, 43.6% in 1940, 55% in 1950, 61.9% in 1960, and
62.9% in 1970. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Historical Census of Housing Tables (Oct. 31,
2011), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/FQQ2-UFRS.
85
Historical Census of Housing Tables, supra note 84.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
HOBBS & STOOPS, supra note 84, at 11.
89
Id. at 76.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
David L. Moran, Homeownership is Colorblind: The Role of African American Savings
and Loans in Home Finance, 1880–1980, 8 BUS. & ECON. HISTORY ON-LINE 2 (2010),
available at http://perma.cc/3ZAV-746W.
93
Id.
94
Id. (referring to a 1931 federal study on homeownership).
95
Id. at 3.
THE
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in homeownership rates between non-Hispanic Caucasians and African
Americans based on the available data was roughly 20%.96
The federal government created a few agencies that helped increase
homeownership from 1934 through the 1970s. In 1934, Congress created the
Federal Housing Administration,97 and the Veterans’ Administration in
1944.98 However, nationally sanctioned acts of discrimination and other
policies of discrimination did not benefit minorities until the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, which prohibited discrimination based on race and ethnicity
in the leasing and/or sale of real property.99
2. Late 20th Century (1980–1999)
The late 20th Century saw homeownership rate gains for all Americans.
In 1980 the homeownership rate was 64.4%.100 In 1990 during the start of
a recession until 1991,101 the national homeownership rate fell slightly to
64.2%.102 In 1995, the rate improved to 64.7%.103 The 20th Century ended
with 66.8% of Americans owning their homes.104
Considering homeowners’ races or ethnicities, Caucasians had a homeownership rate of 70% between 1996 and 1999.105 African Americans had a
homeownership rates right at 40%.106 Latinos’ homeownership rates from
1996 improved almost 3% by 1999.107 Asians were the only minority group
to have more than 50% homeownership rate between 1996 and 1999.108
96

Id. at 8.
Robert M. Couch, The Great Recession’s Most Unfortunate Victim: Homeownership, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD U. 11 (Nov. 1, 2013), available at
http://perma.cc/TDX2-5H9S.
98
Id.
99
FAIR HOUSING ACT, supra note 56. Although the GI Bill of Rights protected
servicemen from discrimination after World War II, federal or state laws offered no
protections against discrimination to the general public. Moran, supra note 92.
100
Historical Census of Housing Tables, supra note 84.
101
ROBERT N. IRELAND, A NEW KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE GREAT RECESSION,
NAT. BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (2010).
102
Historical Census of Housing Tables, supra note 84.
103
See id.
104
See id.
105
See id. (stating the Caucasians’ homeownership rates from 1996–1999 was: 71.7%
(1996), 72% (1997), 72.6% (1998) and 73.2% (1999)).
106
See id. (reporting that African Americans’ homeownership rates from 1996–1999
was: 44.1% (1996), 44.8% (1997), 45.6% (1998) and 46.3% (1999)).
107
See id. (stating that Latinos’ homeownership rates from 1996–1999 was: 42.8%
(1996), 43.3% (1997), 44.7% (1998), and 45.5% (1999)).
108
See id. (reporting that Asians grouped with Pacific Islanders in the report had
homeownership rates of: 50.8% (1996), 52.8% (1997), 52.6% (1998), and 53.1% (1999)).
97
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The homeownership gaps between Caucasians and other minority groups
were considerable. The gap between Caucasians’ and African Americans’
homeownership rates was approximately 27.2%.109 With Latinos, the difference in homeownership rates was around 28.3%.110 The gap between
Caucasians and Asians was smaller at approximately 20.1%.111
3. Early 21st Century (2000–2005)
By 2000, more than two-thirds of Americans owned homes.112 The
homeownership rate increased each following year until it reached its peak,
69%, in 2004.113 After reaching historic heights, the real estate market crash
resulted in a downward turn in homeownership across all racial groups beginning in the last quarter of 2005.114
Examining homeownership rates based on race and ethnicity, as expected, Caucasians continued to represent the largest group of homeowners.
For Caucasians, their highest rate of homeownership, 76.2%, was in the 4th
quarter of 2004.115 African Americans also achieved their highest rate of
homeownership between 2000 and 2005. In the second quarter of 2004,
African Americans’ homeownership rate reached a historic high of 49.7%.116
During the fourth quarter of 2005, the peak homeownership rate for Latinos was 50%.117 Asian Americans’ homeownership rate, the largest percentage of all minority homeowners, maxed out at 60.1% in 2006.118
Comparing the highest level of ownership rates between Caucasians and
minority groups, which these groups achieved before the real estate market
decline in 2004 and 2005, one can still see a great disparity in homeownership rates. For African Americans, though, that gulf in homeownership
rate was the largest at 26.5%.119 The difference in homeownership rates
for Latinos and Caucasians was 26.2%.120 Asian Americans had the closest
109
See id. The average homeownership rate for Caucasians from 1996–1999 was
72.4% while the average homeownership rate for African Americans was 45.2%. Id.
110
See id. The average homeownership rate for Latinos from 1996–1999 was 44.1%. Id.
111
See id. The average homeownership rate for Asians from 1996–1999 was 53.2%. Id.
112
See id. Approximately 67.4% of Americans owned homes. Id.
113
See id. The homeownership rates for 2001–2004 were 67.8% (2001), 67.9%
(2002), 67.9% (2003), and 68.3% (2004). Id.
114
See The State of the Nation’s Housing 2013, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF
HARVARD U., at 17 (2013), available at http://perma.cc/5XSL-KFPM.
115
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, supra note 13.
116
See id.
117
See id.
118
See id.
119
See id.
120
See id.
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homeownership rate to Caucasians, being within 16.1% of the Caucasian
homeownership rate.121 Between 2000 and 2005, housing gaps between
minorities and non-minorities were narrowing.122 However, the Great
Recession would reverse these gains.
4. The Great Recession (2006–2009)
The number of homeowners precipitously fell consistently each year
after 2006 by 1.2 million.123 In 2007, the total homeownership rate in the U.S.
was 68.1%, a drop of nearly 1% since 2004.124 The homeownership rate
dropped to 67.4% by 2009.125
Reviewing the data available on ownership based on race and ethnicity,
Caucasian homeownership rates dropped from 72.6% in 2006 to 71.4 % in
2009.126 This represents an overall 1.2% decline in homeownership. African
American homeownership rates dropped from 47.9% in 2006 to 46.2% in
2009,127 a 1.7% plunge in homeownership. Latinos experienced a similar decrease from 49.7% in 2006 to 48.4% in 2009.128 This is a 1.3% decline. Likewise, Asians also witnessed declines in homeownership rates from 60.8%,
a record high, to 59.3%, a 1.5% decrease.129 Comparatively, the group
with the smallest percentage of homeownership, African Americans, had
the greatest dive in homeownership rates.
5. Housing Market “Recovery” Period (2010–2013)
U.S. homeownership rates reached record lows between 2010 and 2013.
In 2010, the American homeownership rate was 66.9%.130 The homeownership rate dropped to 66.3% in 2011.131 Between 2011 and 2012, homeownership fell by 0.7% down to approximately 65.5%.132 Similarly, the
121

See id.
See id.
123
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD U., supra note 114.
124
See id. at 36.
125
See id.
126
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, supra note 13. The homeownership rates for
Caucasians during 2006–2009 were: 72.6% (2006), 72% (2007), 71.7% (2008), and
71.4% (2009). Id.
127
See id. The 2006–2009 homeownership rates for African Americans were: 47.9%
(2006), 47.2% (2007), 47.4% (2008), and 46.2% (2009). Id.
128
See id. Latino 2006–2009 homeownership rates were: 49.7% (2006), 49.7%
(2007), 49.1% (2008), and 48.4% (2009). Id.
129
See id. The homeownership rates for Asians during 2006–2009 were: 60.8%
(2006), 60% (2007), 59.5% (2008), and 59.3% (2009). Id.
130
See id.
131
See id.
132
See id. at 5.
122
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housing market declined further during the first quarter of 2013 down to
65%.133 The U.S. Census Bureau reported that the homeownership rate had
plummeted to only 65.1% in 2013.134 Needless to say, the decline in homeownership evidences a slower climb out of the real estate market crisis
than previously heralded.135
Although there is an overall decline in homeownership, minority homeownership has dropped more substantially. Caucasian homeownership rates
are at 73.5%, a decade low.136 Conversely, African American homeownership has declined to 43.9%, which is its lowest rate since 1995.137 Latino
homeownership rates are 46%.138
Amidst the narrative that the housing and mortgage market is rebound139
ing, homeownership rates remain depressed for all races140 approximately
five years after the so-called end of the “housing and market crisis”.141 Comparing the homeownership data based on race and ethnicity from 2010 to
2013, one can see a sizeable gulf in homeownership rates growing between
certain minority groups and Caucasians.142
The 2010–2013 homeownership rates for Caucasians were 74.5% in
2010, 73.8% in 2011, 73.6% in 2012, and 73.4% in 2013.143 African American homeownership rates for the same time period were 45.4% in 2010,
44.9% in 2011, 43.9% in 2012, and 43.1% in 2013.144 For Latinos, homeownership rates from 2010 to 2013 were 47.5% in 2010, 46.9% in 2011,
46.1% in 2012, and 46% in 2013.145
133

See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD U., supra note 114.
See Callis & Kresin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, BULLETIN ON RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES
AND HOMEOWNERSHIP IN THE FOURTH QUARTER 2013, Table 4SA (2013), available at http://
perma.cc/T398-MAXN. Homeownership rates for the U.S. have not been this low since
1994 when the rate was 64%. See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, supra note 13, at 6.
135
Christopher Matthews, After 8 Years, the Real Estate Market is Finally Looking
Normal Again, FORTUNE.COM (Mar. 31, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/03/31/after-8
-years-the-real-estate-market-is-finally-looking-normal-again/, archived at http://perma.cc
/F9L4-TYHH (noting that an alignment between the supply and demand is a sign of a
normal real estate market).
136
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, supra note 13, at 9.
137
See id.
138
See id.
139
See Matthews, supra note 135.
140
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, supra note 13, at 9.
141
Many argue that the housing crisis existed in the U.S. only from 2006–2009. If this is
true, then it follows that the crisis is over and the real estate market’s recovery began in 2010.
See Matthews, supra note 135.
142
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, supra note 13, at 9
143
See id.
144
See id.
145
See id.
134
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The decline in homeownership numbers for minorities is particularly
conspicuous in 2012. According to the Census Bureau’s Annual Social and
Economic Supplement, only 44% of African Americans, 57% of Asians, and
46% of Latinos owned their own homes, compared to 73% of Caucasians.146
Homeownership gaps that had somewhat narrowed from the mid-1980s
through the mid-2000s, widened again from 2007 onward, especially for
African Americans.147 The Pew Research Center published a report that the
gap between African Americans and Caucasians in 2012 is similar to the
status quo of 1976.148 For Latinos, the Latino homeownership gap scantly
narrowed with Caucasians in 2012.149 When compared with the 78% Caucasian homeownership rate, Asians had the narrowest homeownership gap.150
Since experiencing peak homeownership rates in 2004 through 2012, Caucasian homeownership rates fell only 2.7% while homeownership rates for
African Americans and Latinos dropped by 5.8% and 3.3%, respectively.151
The disparity in homeownership rates begs two questions: (1) what is the
effect of these homeownership gaps; and (2) if differences in homeownership rates are revelatory, then what solutions are available to narrow the gaps?
To answer both questions, one must first critically examine the pervasive
problem of lending discrimination. Once it is determined that lending discrimination exists, it is incumbent on relevant actors not to fall into the captious web of politics and policy statements, but to find concrete solutions
that provide minorities with the ability to equitably retain or attain homeownership. The perpetuation of economic gaps between minorities and the
majority engenders a policy of segregation152 and could ultimately prevent
minorities from joining the middle class.153 The federal government has
146

See King’s Dream Remains an Elusive Goal; Many Americans See Racial Disparities,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 22, 2013), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013
/08/22/kings-dream-remains-an-elusive-goal-many-americans-see-racial-disparities/4/#black
-home, archived at http://perma.cc/EMY5-ZWU6.
147
See id.
148
See id. (noting that after 1976, the gap between African American and Caucasian
homeownership rates fluctuated greatly as African American homeownership rose, only
to return in 2012 to a nearly 40 year high).
149
See id.
150
See id.
151
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD U., supra note 114, at 17.
152
See Charles L. Nier, III, The Shadow of Credit: The Historical Origins of Racial
Predatory Lending and Its Impact upon African American Wealth Accumulation, 11 U.
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 131 (2008) (quoting then-Senator Barack Obama, Remarks at
the Constitution Center: A More Perfect Union (Mar. 8, 2008)).
153
See Sen. Tom Harkin, Chairperson, Saving the American Dream: The Past, Present and
Uncertain Future of America’s Middle Class (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.harkin.senate
.gov/documents/pdf/4e5fa704f2533.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/63RT-AXHA (stating
that “a strong middle class is the cornerstone of a strong America”).
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taken bigger steps in establishing economic reform.154 However, a problematic concern regarding these reformative efforts is that past efforts to bridge
homeownership gaps have proven unsuccessful. Perhaps it is important to
reexamine these ineffective efforts within the historical and current landscape
of lending discrimination in the U.S.
IV. HOMEOWNERSHIP: A STEP TOWARD BRIDGING THE
ECONOMIC WEALTH GAP
All racial or ethnic groups took a financial hit because of the housing
industry meltdown. This is particularly devastating because a home is
most Americans’ largest asset.155 When one owns a home, he is building his
own personal net wealth.156
For the most part, home losses, and thus personal net worth losses,
were staggering for all races and ethnicities during the mortgage and foreclosure crisis. The effects of lending discrimination magnified these losses
for African Americans and Latinos. More African Americans and Latinos,
who represent a smaller percentage of total homeowners, lost their homes
or became upside down in their mortgages than any other racial groups during the crisis as a result.157
When comparing net worth along racial and ethnic lines, two things
are evident. First, minorities have lower net worth than Caucasians generally. Pertaining to personal net worth, Caucasians’ average net worth at the
height of the housing market, in 2005, was approximately $134,992.158 In
2009, at the height of the foreclosure crisis, this group’s net worth fell 16%,
down to $113,149.159 Comparatively, African Americans’ average net worth
was only $12,124 in 2005.160 By 2009, however, this groups’ average net
worth dwindled by 53% to $5,677.161 Similarly, Latinos’ median net worth
154

See infra Part IX.
Rick Santorum, Wealth Creation in the New Millennium—Transforming Poverty in
America, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L . ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383, 391 (2002) (quoting Michael L.
Daven & Patricia J. Fisher, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Household Net Worth & Asset Ownership
1995 vii (Feb. 2000) and stating that “[f]or most Americans, the avenue to wealth
creation—from generation to generation—is through the front door of their first home”).
156
See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH & SOCIAL
POLICY IN AMERICA 8 (1999); Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 34, at 31.
157
See Bocian et al., supra note 43, at 3.
158
See Rakesh Kochkar, Richard Fray & Paul Taylor, Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs
Between Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jul. 26, 2011), http://www
.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-between-whites-blacks
-hispanics/, archived at http://perma.cc/YBE5-GETA.
159
See id.
160
See id.
161
See id.
155
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dropped 66% from $18,359 in 2005 to $6,325 in 2009.162 In contrast, Asians’
average net worth was higher than Caucasians with a net worth of $168,103
in 2005, but sharply declined by 54% to $78,066 in 2009, falling below the
average Caucasian net worth.163
Second, the importance of the home as an asset in a homeowners’ portfolio is nonidentical for Caucasians and minority groups. To understand
how the housing crisis translated into greater net worth losses for minority
groups, one must understand the impact of homeownership on net worth
for each group. According to a recent study, home equity represented 62%
of the median African American owner’s net wealth and 67% of the median
Latino owner’s net wealth.164 On the other hand, home equity represents only
38% of the median Caucasian owner’s net worth.165 This study shows that
homeownership is a critically significant asset in African American and
Latinos’ financial portfolios. With a higher percentage of one’s net wealth
being based on equity in a home, it follows that the loss of this asset more
devastatingly decreases the overall net worth of these two minority
groups. As a result of catastrophic home losses during the crisis, the
wealth gap swelled between Caucasians and African Americans, Latinos,
and Asians.166
Besides taking one’s shelter, foreclosures have other wealth-depleting or
limiting attributes. For instance, with a home, there is no equity to use for
other wealth building ventures, such as using home equity as leverage for
business or education loans, or having the ability to transfer wealth to the next
generation at death. Similarly, foreclosure losses can depreciate home values to neighboring properties, leading to increased crime rates and community blight.167
Of particular note is that most foreclosures were concentrated in predominantly minority communities.168 It has been estimated that African American
and Latino communities have suffered such economic losses in the amount
of $94 billion and $177 billion, respectively, between 2009 and 2012.169 It
was soon discovered that these losses were due to lending discrimination.
162

See id.
See id.
164
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD U., supra note 114, at 14.
165
See id.
166
A source recently reported that, in 2010, the median net worth of Caucasians was
as much as 7.9 times higher than African Americans and 8.2 times higher than Latinos.
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD U., supra note 114, at 14.
167
See Bocian et al., supra note 43, at 11.
168
Id. at 3 (stating that “the indirect losses in wealth that result from foreclosures as a
result of depreciation to nearby properties will disproportionately impact communities of
color.”).
169
See id. at 3.
163
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For these victims, agencies capable of enforcing the laws that were in place
to prevent lending discrimination typically failed to enforce these laws or
tacitly sanctioned such activities.170 Likewise, homeowners had little power
to curb discriminatory lending because the high standards made claims
difficult to prove.171 For these reasons, the American Dream of homeownership became a panoply of national policies with feckless pledges to tighten
homeownership gaps between minorities and non-minorities.
V. EFFORTS TO BRIDGE MINORITY HOMEOWNERSHIP GAPS
It is generally accepted that
the value of homeownership is deeply ingrained in American public
culture. From early laws requiring landownership for the right to vote,
to nineteenth-century homestead legislation, to contemporary real estate brochures, the ownership of a home has long been presented as a
crucial part of the ‘stake in society’ expected of full-fledged members
of American communities.172

In many ways, homeownership as an aspect of the American Dream is
a byproduct of the federal government’s stated housing policies. Arguably,
the United States has had a policy encouraging homeownership since 1913.
The Revenue Act of 1913 allowed homeowners to deduct mortgage interest
payments.173 Allowing mortgage interest deductions has been, and continues
to be, touted as an incentive for or benefit of homeownership.174
The ideal of homeownership as a part of the American Dream was
adopted again after World War II. On July 15, 1949, President Harry S.
Truman signed into law the Housing Act of 1949.175 In his statement,
President Truman said:
170

See Richard Rothstein, A Comment on Bank of America/Countrywide’s Discriminatory
Mortgage Lending and Its Implications for Racial Segregation, ECON. POL’Y INST.
(2012), available at http://www.epi.org/publication/bp335-boa-countrywide-discriminatory
-lending/, archived at http://perma.cc/5BNZ-XQGS (alleging that regulators entrusted to
enforce lending discrimination laws “turned a blind eye, or worse,” for nearly a century).
171
See infra Part IX.
172
WILLIAM M. ROHE & HARRY L. WATSON, CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM: NEW
PERSPECTIVES IN AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP vii (2007).
173
See REVENUE ACT OF 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
174
See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 711
(1970).
175
See Pres. Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President upon Signing the Housing Act
of 1949 (Jul. 15, 1949), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?, archived at http://perma
.cc/XK7R-U22Z.
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[t]he Housing Act of 1949 ... establishes as a national objective the
achievement as soon as feasible of a decent home and a suitable living
environment for every American family, and sets forth the policies to
be followed in advancing toward that goal. These policies are thoroughly
consistent with American ideals and traditions.176

The Housing Act of 1949 created the Direct Single Family Housing
Loan and Grants program for qualified families.177 This Act did not provide
housing for all Americans. Minorities were not included within the American housing acts until 1954.178
In the 1950s, President Eisenhower’s Advisory Committee on Housing
Policies and Programs issued a final report which noted that “too often, the
opportunities of minority families to obtain adequate housing are extremely
limited or non-existent. Too often, the workings of our free economy do
not provide solutions that benefit minorities.”179 The advisory committee
demanded that “changes in the attitudes of private investors”180 be “bolstered
by vigorous administrative practice.”181
President Eisenhower signed the Housing Act of 1954 into law on
August 2, 1954. The Act focused on urban renewal.182 In his statement
upon signing the Act into law, President Eisenhower said that the Act improved upon the 1949 Housing Act by fortifying “private mortgage credit
facilities” by “reorganizing the Federal National Mortgage Association.”183
Furthermore, under the Act, “private financial institutions have a really
good chance to mobilize their own resources to supply adequate mortgage
credit ... to home owners in every part of our country.”184
The principles of the 1949 and 1954 Housing Acts were incorporated into
the Fair Housing Act of 1968.185 Included within the Fair Housing Act was
the Federal Housing Administration’s Section 235 Home Owner Assistance
176

Id.
See 7 C.F.R. § 3550.1-50.2 (2014).
178
See B.T. McGraw, The Housing Act of 1954 and Implications for Minorities, 16
PHYLON 171, 172 (1955), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/272718, archived at
http://perma.cc/8EG2-WTJK (asserting that the Housing Act of 1954 now included a purpose
to help minorities obtain mortgage credit through a regional committee under the Voluntary
Home Mortgage Credit Extension Program).
179
Id. at 176.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
68 Stat. 590 (1954).
183
Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President upon Signing the Housing
Act of 1954, Aug. 2, 1954, 1954 Pub. Papers 675 (1954) available at http://www.presidency
.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9962, archived at http://perma.cc/V824-NUU2.
184
Id.
185
See FAIR HOUSING ACT, supra note 56.
177
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program.186 Under this program, the FHA subsidized loans for low-income
families by offering mortgage insurance, which places the burden of a loan
on HUD, and by lowering interest rates.187 HUD had a goal of “expanding
homeownership and equal housing opportunities, and assuring reasonable
shelter costs.”188 The program also required very low down payments.189
Instead of expanding homeownership, this program was an epic fail and was
ultimately discontinued in the 1970s.190
Even though each of the preceding efforts was, in some way, well intentioned with hopes of perpetuating the American Dream, the programs did
very little to make homeownership a reality, particularly for minorities.
Moreover, some private lenders who extended credit insured by the government used these policies to make homeownership more difficult for minority groups. For example, hundreds of thousands of minorities faced steering,
redlining, and other forms of discrimination when attempting to utilize
these programs.191
Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA)192 to
combat redlining and discrimination.193 The CRA guidelines required financial institutions “to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in
which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound opinion of such
institution.”194 The CRA’s purpose was to increase competition in neglected
minority and low-income communities. Implicit within the mandate was to
eliminate discrimination and cultivate a non-discriminatory system for credit,
186

See HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 235, 82
Stat. 476, 476-85, repealed by Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 401(d), 101 Stat. 1898, 1899 (1988).
187
See id.
188
Sylvia C. Martinez, The Housing Act of 1949: Its Place in the Realization of the
American Dream of Homeownership, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 467, 469 (2000).
189
See Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing
Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1312
(1995) (revealing that some home owners were required to produce down payments as
low as $200 and interest rates were reduced as low as 1%).
190
See id. Some of the problems included “blockbusting” whereby realtors would cause
consternation by “warning” owners in majority Caucasian neighborhoods of the dangers
of the neighborhood becoming entirely black. A large majority of the owners, if not all of
them, sold their homes, which resulted in “white flight.” See id. Similarly, FHA appraisers
were bribed to actively participate in fraud by overlooking severe structural defects. Id.
By 1979, 18% of Section 235 homes were either in foreclosure or assigned to HUD. See
id. Therefore, instead of expanding homeownership to the underserved, the Home Owners
Assistance program appears to have exacerbated the problem.
191
See id. at 1317–18.
192
See COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT OF 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-125, tit. VIII, 91 Stat.
1147 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–09 (2012)).
193
See Schill & Wachter, supra note 189, at 1318.
194
12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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including home mortgages.195 The Federal Reserve Board and other federal
agencies routinely conduct assessments of CRA institutions.196 Part of the
evaluation considers whether evidence of lending discrimination or other
unlawful credit practices exists.197
President William J. Clinton announced his administration’s “National
Homeownership Strategy” (NHS) on November 5, 1994.198 President Clinton’s desire, in collaboration with various governmental and private industry actors,199 was to expand homeownership by 8 million new homeowners
between 1995 and 2000, up to a 67.5% homeownership rate.200 The NHS
involved 100 detailed actions201 that combined “private and public sector
resources and commitments to implement three broad approaches designed to
make homeownership more affordable, accessible, and available.”202
Some of the noteworthy Actions were:
x
195

Action 29: Alternative Approaches to Homebuyer Transactions.203

Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283,
1301 (2014) (stating that reforms, like CRA, were created to “oblige banks to foster economic
equality and to refrain from discrimination against customers or neighborhoods. These
reforms focused on removing barriers to credit for people of color as well as low-income
communities.”).
196
See Community Reinvestment Act, FED. RESERVE BD., http://www.federalreserve
.gov/communitydev/cra_about.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma
.cc/4J6D-UW3P.
197
The federal agencies examine whether a financial institution has violated any of the
following laws: Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Fair Housing Act, Section 32 of the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Truth in
Lending Act and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Act. See The Community Reinvestment
Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 110th Cong. 1-1, 1-4 (2008) (testimony of
Sandra F. Braunstein, Dir. of Consumer & Cmt’y Affairs).
198
See THE NATIONAL HOMEOWNERSHIP STRATEGY: PARTNERS IN THE AMERICAN
DREAM, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., 1-1 (May 1995); see also Pres. William J.
Clinton, Remarks on the National Homeownership Strategy (Jun. 5, 1995), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51448, archived at http://perma.cc/BB3R-9HD5.
199
See THE NATIONAL HOMEOWNERSHIP STRATEGY: PARTNERS IN THE AMERICAN
DREAM, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., 1-1 (May 1995). “Partners in the American
Dream” of the NHS included, in part: the American Bankers Association, American Land
Title Association, Fannie Mae, Federal Home Loan Bank System, Freddie Mac, Mortgage
Bankers Association of America, National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, National Association of Realtors, National Bankers Association, National Council of
La Raz, National Urban League, Mortgage Bankers Association of America, U.S. Department
of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, and U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development. See id.
200
See id. at 1-1.
201
See id. at 1-1 to 1-10.
202
Id. at 1-2.
203
Id. at 1-7.
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Action 35: Home Mortgage Loan to Value Flexibility.204
Action 36: Subsidies to Reduce Down Payment and Mortgage
Costs.205
Action 37: IRAs & 401(k)s for Homeownership Down Payments.206
Action 39: Mortgage Options and Homebuyer Education.207
Action 44: Flexible Mortgage Underwriting Criteria.208
Action 45: Public-Private Leveraging for Affordable Home
Financing.209
Action 58: Federal & State Resources for Affordable Homeownership.210
Action 71: Access to Mortgage Lending Data.211
Action 72: Research on Fair Lending & Insurance Issues.212

The NHS would be declared a success by 1996 due to an almost 1%
increase in the national homeownership rate from 64.2% in 1994 to 65.1%
in 1995.213 However, many believe that such easy access to mortgages set
the stage for the real estate market crash.214 Additionally, the number of subprime mortgage originations exponentially increased during the tenure of
the NHS, from $35 billion in 1994 to $140 billion in 2000.215 Moreover,
204

Id. at 1-7.
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 1-8.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 1-9.
212
Id.
213
HUD Announces Sharpest Rise in Homeownership Rate in at Least 30 Years;
Highest in Homeownership Rate since 1981; Over 1.4 Million New Homeowners Added
in 1995, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. Release No. 96-11 (Feb. 8, 1996).
214
See, e.g., Brian Gilmore, Adrienne Decuire et al., The Nightmare on Main Street for
African-Americans: A Call for a New National Policy Focus on Homeownership, 10
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 262, 269 (2008); Priya S. Gupta, The American Dream,
Deferred: Contextualizing Property After the Foreclosure Crisis, 73 MD. L. REV. 523,
537 (2014); Whitney Ross, The Coming Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
Disaster, THE AFFORDABLE MORTG. DEPRESSION (Apr. 3, 2009, 6:53 PM), http://the
affordablemortgagedepression.blogspot.com/2009/04/coming-federal-housing-administra
tion.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3CT4-326F.
215
Elizabeth Laderman, Subprime Mortgage Lending and the Capital Markets,
FRBSF Economic Letter, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. 1 (Dec. 28, 2001), available at
http://perma.cc/UL4H-R9P5.
205
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the share of subprime mortgages in the total mortgage market swelled from
5% in 1994 to 13.4% in 2000.216
President George W. Bush’s administration embraced a national homeownership policy called the “Ownership Society.”217 Through the Ownership Society, President Bush pledged to have “more people owning their
own home” because it is “[a] national interest that more people own their
own home.”218 In 2004, the national homeownership rate reached its peak
rate of 69.2%.219 President Bush wanted to use this policy to increase the
number of minority homeowners by 5.5 million by 2010.220 Although homeownership rates increased for minorities through 2006, minority rates started
to decline in 2007.221
The data show that African American homeownership rates were 2%
lower, at around 43%, in 2013 than they were in 1990, at 45.2%, despite
these national homeownership policy incentives.222 The government and
private industry created a system in which fair access to mortgage credit was
a mirage that lenders utilized to victimize minorities and lower classes.
The U.S. spent billions of dollars on these housing programs while banks
made trillions of dollars in order to “fulfill the call” of these programs.223
However, arguably, these programs created a system of widespread deception
216

Id.
Expanding Home Ownership, Pres. George W. Bush’s Record of Achievement,
THE WHITE HOUSE, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/achievement
/chap7.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PJQ3-M7EL.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
See supra Parts III.A.2–3.
222
Annie-Rose Strasser, The Housing Crisis Pushed Black Homeownership Rate
Below 1990 Level, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 12, 2012, 10:45 AM), http://thinkprogress.org
/economy/2012/03/12/442397/black-homeowneship-plummets/, archived at http://perma
.cc/5T3K-HC73.
223
Adam Carasso, Gillian Reynolds & C. Eugene Steuerle, How Much Does the Federal Government Spend to Promote Economic Mobility and For Whom?, URBAN.ORG,
available at http://perma.cc/7ZN3-DC98 (reporting the federal government spent approximately $312.3 billion in homeownership programs in 2006); Robin Sidel & Saabira
Chaudhuri, U.S. Bank Profits Near Record Levels, WSJ.COM (Aug. 11, 2014, 7:55 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-banking-industry-profits-racing-to-near-record-levels-1407
773976. Banks and thrifts have earned an estimated $955.5 billion in profits between
2004 and 2014. Id. This, despite, deficits in 4th quarter of 2008 and 1st, 2nd and 4th quarters in 2009. In addition to these profits, banks have received billions in federal government bailouts. See Bailed Out Banks, CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cnn.com/news/spe
cials/storysupplement/bankbailout/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc
/G5KA-KSWT. Taken together, the clear winners during the housing and foreclosure crisis,
and continuing, are banks and thrifts.
217
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and fraud perpetrated by predatory wolves dressed in sheep’s clothing
(lenders), which the government tolerated, or tacitly authorized by inaction,
until the mortgage lending system effectively drove countless minorities
out of the mortgage market completely. As a result, those affected by the
foreclosure crisis will likely refashion the definition of the American Dream
to exclude homeownership entirely.
VI. FORECLOSURE NUMBERS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY
Foreclosure has adversely marked millions of Americans. During 2007
and 2009, lenders foreclosed on an estimated 2.5 million mortgages.224 The
data very clearly demonstrate that African American and Latino homeowners
were disproportionately affected by foreclosures in relation to their share
of mortgage originations.225 Of the loans originated between 2005 and
2008, an estimated 8% of both African Americans and Latinos have lost
their homes to foreclosures, while only 4.5% of whites lost their homes.226
Non-Hispanic whites represented approximately 56% of families foreclosed upon between 2007 and 2009.227 On the other hand, 11.6% of African American and 16.2% of Latino families were foreclosed upon during this
same time.228 Although more non-Hispanic whites lost their homes through
foreclosure than any other racial group, the impact of loss is much greater for
African Americans and Latinos, whose estimated proportion of mortgage
originations were 7.8% and 11.2%, respectively.229 The Center for Responsible Lending estimated that African Americans lost 240,020 homes and
Latinos lost 335,950 homes between 2007 and 2009.230
Interestingly, the suspicion that most of the foreclosure disparities
would be concentrated in lower income classes was disproven by the data
examined by the Center for Responsible Lending.231 The data show similar
levels of foreclosure rate disparities on all income levels—low, moderate,
middle, and high. For instance, non-Hispanic Caucasians had an approximated 74.1%, African Americans possessed about 14.8%, and Latinos accounted for around 11% of the low-income mortgage originations between

224

Bocian et al., supra note 43, at 1.
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 2.
228
Id. at 2.
229
Id. at 8.
230
Id.
231
Id. at 10.
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2005 and 2008.232 The percentages of completed low-income foreclosures
from 2007 to 2009 were as follows: non-Hispanic whites accounted for
67.1% of the foreclosures, African Americans made up 21%, and Latinos
accounted for 11.9%.233
The data further revealed that the African American share of mortgage
origination rates declined at the middle and high-income levels.234 In contrast, non-Hispanic Caucasians and Latinos mortgage origination slightly
increased.235 Unexpectedly, however, the rates of completed foreclosure indicated higher disparity ratios. Regarding the middle-income level, the completed foreclosures between 2007 and 2009 were: 66.5% for non-Hispanic
whites, 14.5% for African Americans, and 13.2% for Latinos.236 On the highincome level, the completed foreclosures from 2007 to 2009 were: 67.3% for
non-Hispanic whites, 9.9% for African Americans, and 22.8% for Latinos.237
VII. LENDING DISCRIMINATION DURING THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
During the housing market meltdown, foreclosure actions uncovered
discriminatory practices by lenders.238 There is evidence that certain lenders methodically targeted certain minority groups, causing these borrowers
to pay more for loans not because of their credit scores, but because of their
national origin, ethnicity, or race.239 Other reprehensible conduct by lenders
during the real estate market depression included steering minorities into
subprime mortgages240 and refusing to lend in minority communities, in other
words, redlining.241
After many years of lax enforcement, city, state, and the federal government finally took action to enforce lending discrimination laws. In response to the increasing number of fair lending discrimination cases, the
232

Id. The rates were similar for moderate-income borrowers. The number of moderateincome mortgage originations (with completed foreclosures) by race was: Caucasians
(non-Hispanic)—75.4% (66.5%), African Americans—12.3% (18%), and Latinos—12.3%
(15.5%). Id.
233
Id.
234
Id. On the middle-income level, African American represented 9.8% of these mortgage
originations. Id. Regarding high-income mortgage originations, African Americans had 6.4%
of these mortgage originations. Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Examining Lending Discrimination Practices and Foreclosure Abuses: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Examining Lending
Discrimination] (statement of Asst. Att’y Gen. Thomas E. Perez, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE).
239
Id.; Bocian et al., supra note 43, at 11.
240
Examining Lending Discrimination, supra note 238.
241
Id.

2015]

LENDING DISCRIMINATION & HOMEOWNERSHIP

631

DOJ created the Fair Lending Unit within the Civil Rights Division’s Housing and Civil Enforcement Section in 2010.242 In its first two years, the
Fair Lending Unit filed and/or resolved sixteen lending matters, which was an
increase in the average of around two cases per year from 1993 to 2008.243
In 2011, the Fair Lending Unit filed eight lawsuits based on lending related matters and procured eight settlements, totaling about $350 million.244
The largest lending discrimination settlement was with Countrywide Financial Corporation.245 In United States v. Countrywide Financial Corporation,
Countrywide Home Loans and Countrywide Bank,246 the Fair Lending Unit
alleged that Countrywide Financial (Countrywide) engaged in systemic acts
of discrimination based on race, national origin, and marital status in residential mortgage lending in violation of the Fair Housing Act and Equal Credit
Opportunity Acts.247 In its complaint, the government alleged that Countrywide’s home mortgage lending policies permitted it to target Hispanic and
African American mortgagors by placing them in subprime mortgages, and
by charging higher loan fees and costs.248 It is alleged that there were over
200,000 victims of Countrywide’s discriminatory lending practices.249 On
December 28, 2011, the court issued a consent order that settled the lawsuit for $335 million.250 As a part of the agreement, should Countrywide
decide to enter into the mortgage lending market, the Fair Lending Unit
must review its lending practices and policies.251
Another complaint was filed in United States v. C & F Mortgage Corporation on September 30, 2011.252 In its complaint, the government alleged
violations of both the Fair Housing Act and ECOA.253 African American and
Hispanic mortgagors were charged higher interest rates and given lesser
discounts than their similarly situated Caucasian counterparts, resulting in
242

Id. Dodd-Frank required the Federal Reserve to create the Fair Lending Unit. DODDFRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1013, 124 Stat. 2136 (2010).
243
Examining Lending Discrimination, supra note 238.
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
No. Civ. 11-10540, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150263, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2011).
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
Examining Lending Discrimination, supra note 238.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Recent Fair Lending Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt
/about/hce/lending_whatnew.php (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc
/CB6U-5SEN.
253
Id.
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a disparate impact on these protected groups.254 This lawsuit was settled.
C & F was required to pay its victims $140,000, develop policies regarding
its lending policies, stay on alert for future racial disparities, and provide
adequate training for its employees.255
The Eastern District of Missouri entered an agreed order in United
States v. Midwest BankCentre on June 28, 2011.256 In this case, the government contended that Midwest BankCentre (Midwest) disparately provided
mortgage lending services to borrowers in predominantly African American
neighborhoods than to those in predominantly Caucasian neighborhoods,
in other words, redlining.257 Because of the agreed order, Midwest agreed
to operate a full-service branch in an African American neighborhood and
invest in the African American areas it redlined.258
Additionally, the DOJ settled a lawsuit with Wells Fargo for $175 million
in 2012.259 The DOJ’s chief complaint was that Wells Fargo, through its
mortgage brokers, charged higher fees and rates to more than 30,000 minority
borrowers compared to white borrowers who posed identical credit risks from
2004 to 2009.260 Likewise, the DOJ alleged that Wells Fargo encouraged at
least 4,000 minority borrowers into subprime mortgages while white borrowers with similar credit risks were given regular mortgage loans.261
In 2013, the City of Los Angeles filed two lawsuits against Citicorp
and Wells Fargo, alleging lending discrimination and predatory lending
practices.262 The City of Los Angeles alleges that both Citicorp and Wells
254

Id.
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
Midwest was to expend “$900,000 in a special financing program to increase the
amount of credit the bank extends” in the formerly redlined African-American areas. In
addition, Midwest agreed to spend $300,000 for consumer education and credit repair
programs, and $250,000 on customer outreach and promotion of their credit products and
services. Id.
259
Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 12,
2012, at B3.
260
Id.
261
Id. Wells Fargo announced that it ceased making subprime loans in 2008. Id. This
moratorium lasted approximately six years. Recently, Wells Fargo began issuing subprime
mortgages to applicants with at least a credit score of 600, a lower approval than the prior
limit of 640. Peter Rudegeair & Michelle Conlin, Wells Fargo Edges Back into Subprime
as U.S. Mortgage Market Thaws, REUTERS.COM (Feb. 14, 2014, 3:41 AM), http://www
.reuters.com/article/2014/02/14/us-banks-subprime-insight-idUSBREA1D07820140214,
archived at http://perma.cc/8FBY-BX73.
262
Andrew Khouri, LA Sues Wells Fargo & Citigroup, Alleging Predatory Lending,
LATIMES.COM (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-city
255
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Fargo engaged in redlining and predatory lending practices that resulted in
disproportionate numbers of foreclosures in minority neighborhoods, loss
of $481 million in tax revenues for the City, and an estimated $1.2 billion
in maintenance costs on foreclosed homes.263 The City later filed a similar
lawsuit against Bank of America.264
These cases were a first step in battling mortgage discrimination. However, the effects of lending discrimination cannot be undone. Actively
targeting minority borrowers or pushing minority borrowers into subprime
mortgages when they qualify for prime mortgages is, unquestionably, lending
discrimination. Arguably, the effect of the subprime mortgage crisis was felt
on every economic level: locally, nationally, and internationally.265 However, the fallout of disparate placement in subprime mortgages is on African
Americans and Latinos. Such treatment has far reaching effects and will
undoubtedly perpetuate problems with the real estate market for many years
to come.
VIII. THE EFFECTS OF LENDING DISCRIMINATION
A. Increased Disparities in Homeownership Rates
Involuntary loss of homeownership, especially by foreclosure, is likely
both emotionally and financially devastating to any homeowner. Personally, a
homeowner sustains loss of his or her equity and severe damage to his or
her credit rating,266 and possibly loss of family and community.
One of the most disturbing characteristics of the foreclosure crisis is
that a large majority of its burdens were unevenly borne by African Americans and Latinos because of lending discrimination. The many victims of
lending discrimination continue to suffer through the consequences of
-attorney-lending-20131205,0,2334127.story#axzz2nmE6lbwN, archived at http://perma
.cc/9K32-466J.
263
Id. The City of Los Angeles alleges that Citicorp and Wells Fargo’s discriminatory
lending practices resulting in 200,000 foreclosures in the Los Angeles area alone. Id.
264
Gregory J. Wilcox, Los Angeles Files Third Mortgage-Lending Discrimination Suit,
This Time Against Bank of America, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.daily
news.com/business/20131209/los-angeles-files-third-mortgage-lending-discrimination-suit
-this-time-against-bank-of-america, archived at http://perma.cc/U2PA-KD7V.
265
Hyra et al., supra note 16, at 179 (stating “The U.S. subprime foreclosure crisis
was associated with credit restrictions and diminished consumer confidence, which
devastated the broader national and international economies.”).
266
According to Transunion credit reporting agency, a foreclosure causes a 200-point
drop in a credit score and will result in a 7-year wait before successfully applying for a
new mortgage. What is the Impact of Foreclosure on Your Creditworthiness?, TRANSUNION,
http://www.transunion.com/personal-credit/credit-issues-bad-credit/impact-of-foreclosure
.page (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/76NR-HUS2.
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delinquency or foreclosure without adequate resolution. For example, disparate treatment by lenders caused many of these homeowners to have lower
credit scores as a result of delinquencies and foreclosure.267 With lower credit
scores and tightened credit-lending standards,268 these victims will be revictimized because of a difficult and steep climb to homeownership in the
future. Consequently, lenders are more likely to deny minority and lowerincome applicants for conventional loans269 and the cycle of subprime financing will begin anew with more minorities composing the largest percentage
of subprime mortgages.
One of the lessons learned from the crisis is that high cost and subprime mortgages to minorities correlated to the loss of homeownership by
foreclosure. There was a higher incidence of foreclosure of subprime mortgages held by minorities from 2007 through 2009.270 These losses may continue in the future. According to one report, a disproportionate number of
African Americans, Asians, and Latinos are not yet out of the woods in the
foreclosure crisis.271 Therefore, the economic consequences of lending discrimination are not yet fully known and an autopsy of the housing and foreclosure crisis is premature.
Moreover, and particularly distressing, there is statistical evidence that
African Americans are less likely to become homeowners again once homeownership is terminated.272 Some explanations behind this failure to return
to homeownership include a combination of ability (stricter credit standards bar a return) and desire (the homeowner simply does not want homeownership). Regardless of the reasons, home loans to African Americans
dropped 80% from 1.3 million in 2005 to 280,000 in 2011.273 Likewise, Latinos had a 76% decline in mortgage loans from 1.9 million in 2005 to just
442,000 in 2011.274 Hence, an important and large segment of the population is not participating in the housing market.
267

Id.
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD U., supra note 114, at 19 (stating
“[a]ccess to credit remained limited in 2012.”).
269
Id.
270
Bocian et al., supra note 43, at 7, 10.
271
Ilyce Glink, Foreclosure Crisis Not over for Minorities, CBSNEWS.COM (Jun. 25,
2013, 8:04 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505145_162-57590795/foreclosure-crisis
-not-over-for-minorities/, archived at http://perma.cc/E8R9-A9R2.
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Donald R. Haurin & Stuart S. Rosenthal, The Sustainability of Homeownership:
Factors Affecting the Duration of Homeownership and Rental Spells, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING
& URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEP’T & RESEARCH (Dec. 2004).
273
Jim Carr, The Challenges to Homeownership in America, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Nov. 7, 2013) (relying upon ComplianceTech’s analysis of the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act data for 2011).
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In a speech before the Detroit Economic Club on February 8, 1954,
Albert M. Cole, Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency,
stated:
It is very poor business to ignore one-tenth of our population as a housing market. It is worse than bad business. We are simply not living up
to the standards of a free economic and a democratic society. For the
housing economy has not been a free economy for the Negro.275

Unfortunately, this statement is still relevant for minorities approximately
sixty years later. There were 44.5 million African Americans, alone or in
combination with one or more races, in the United States on July 1, 2012.276
The projected African American population in the United States, either
alone or in combination with other races, for July 1, 2060 is 77.4 million.277
Therefore, barriers to homeownership, such as lending discrimination,
must be eradicated so that the housing market thrives economically, and more
importantly, so that it serves the needs of all segments of the population.
B. Furtherance of Racial Segregation
One of the concomitant, latent effects of inequitable lending is the furtherance of racial segregation278 and lack of economic diversity.279 One of
the first pieces of legislation that recognized racial economic parity was
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (CRA 1866).280 The CRA 1866 gave all citizens, regardless of race, color, or past servitude, the same rights to purchase,
hold, or convey real or personal property, among other things, as white
citizens possessed.281 Although minority citizens were given the same rights
to property as white citizens, there was no mention of where minority
citizens could hold or purchase the property. Therefore, the ingrained belief
that minorities were second-class citizens fashioned a system of segregation following the CRA 1866.

275

McGraw, supra note 178, at 177.
Profile America: Facts for Features, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CB14-FF.03 (2014),
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/cb14
-ff03.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4LPX-AN59.
277
Id.
278
Hyra et al., supra note 16, at 177.
279
See supra Part III.B.
280
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006) & 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2002)).
281
Id.
276
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After tacitly adopting a “separate, but equal” philosophy,282 the federal
government became content with its policy or acceptance of racially segregated society. The 1930’s Fair Housing Administration’s underwriting
guidelines openly embraced the “separate, but equal” principle that “racial homogeneity was essential for stability and desirability of residential areas.”283
State Jim Crow laws kept racial and ethnic citizens separate from white
citizens in housing, jobs, and schools.284 Consequently, a pattern of racial
segregation emerged in most areas of the U.S.285
It became the norm for residential communities to include restrictive
covenants in deeds that typically limited homeowners and their successors
from selling their residences to African Americans, Asians, Jews, or Latinos.286 In Shelley v. Kraemer, home buyers challenged a restrictive covenant
that precluded sales to African Americans.287 The Shelley Court made such
covenants unenforceable.288 Even though explicit restrictive covenants were
282

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (J. Harlan, dissenting).
Robert C. Weaver, Housing Discrimination: An Overview, A Sheltered Crisis, The
State of Fair Housing in the Eighties (Sept. 26–27, 1983) (presented for the U.S. COMM. ON
CIVIL RIGHTS).
284
See Richard Delgado & Juan F. Perea, Racial Templates, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1133,
1148–50 (2014) (discussing historical treatment of racial groups under Jim Crow laws in
America).
285
SEPARATE IS NOT EQUAL, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., http://ameri
canhistory.si.edu/brown/history/1-segregated/segregated-america.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Y9X6-4JLE.
286
The following are examples of restrictive covenants. “This property shall not be used
or occupied by any person or persons except those of the Caucasian race.” Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948). Sometimes the restrictive language was very pointed.
For example,
[A]s a condition precedent to the sale of the same, that hereafter no part
of said property or any portion thereof shall be, for said term of Fiftyyears, occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby to restrict the use of said property for said period of time
against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said property
for resident or other purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 4–5 (1948); see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (dealing
with a restrictive covenant that prohibited any part of a certain area in Chicago from being
“‘sold, leased, or permitted to be occupied by any person of the colored race’” unless 95% of
the neighbors agreed to waive the restriction). Id. at 37–38.
287
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
288
Id. at 20–21. To be effective, racial consciousness and segregation must become a
part of the social psyche. Therefore, there would be no need for laws to eliminate such
atrocities. However, because racial segregation existed prior to Shelley and persists today,
court rulings have had minimal effect on eradicating racism and the lack of opportunities
that spring from it, such as fair lending or homeownership in any area. See Aleatra P.
283
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void, Shelley did very little for the socially accepted and implicit segregation
covenants that existed.
Two landmark Supreme Court cases attempted to challenge the culture of
racial segregation. The plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Kansas289 challenged the accepted “separate, but equal” idea in education
as espoused in the Plessy case.290 Similarly, in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.,291
the Court held that the CRA 1866 prohibited even private sellers from discriminating against persons of color in home sales.292
Although the challenges to segregation, along with other civil rights legislation,293 were successful in deregulating segregation, the United States’
culture of racial segregation lingered. When minorities moved into “forbidden” areas in the past, white families quickly moved out, in what has been
termed “white flight.”294 In short time, these areas became mainly minority
areas.295 The data show that many cities where white flight occurred remained highly segregated in the 21st Century.296 In part, this isolation contributed to the mortgage and foreclosure crisis. Access to fair lending was
not readily available in minority communities.297 Many seeking a home loan
either could not receive a loan or received a high cost loan.298

Williams, Beneath the Stains of Time: The Banality of Race, the Housing and Foreclosure
Crisis, and the Financial Genocide of Minorities, 24 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J ____ (forthcoming 2015) (discussing how the historical conceptualization and construct of produced
a system of socio-legally accepted racial hierarchies).
289
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
290
347 U.S. at 488.
291
392 U.S. 409 (1968).
292
392 U.S. at 413.
293
See, e.g., TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
(2012) (eradicating all state (and local) segregation); TITLE VIII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (1968).
294
Marc Seitles, The Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in America:
Historical Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 89, 101 (1998) (defining “white flight” as the migration of Caucasian
residents in a community when African Americans moved into the community).
295
Id.
296
Erica Ho, Where Are the Top 10 Most Segregated Cities?, TIME.COM (Mar. 31,
2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/03/31/where-are-the-top-10-most-segregated-cities/,
archived at http://perma.cc/3659-P9ZR; Harrison Jacobs, Andy Kiersz & Gus Lubin, The
25 Most Segregated Cities in America, BUSINESSINSIDER.COM (Nov. 22, 2013 10:46 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-segregated-cities-in-america-2013-11?op=1, archived
at http://perma.cc/BN2Q-VADE.
297
Bocian et al., supra note 43, at 6.
298
Id.
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Although many have speculated about or opined on the roots of the real
estate market/mortgage meltdown,299 many have ignored “the role of structural and contextual forces, most notably various trajectories in inequality,
uneven metropolitan development, and racial segregation.”300 Predominantly
heterogeneous minority neighborhoods were the hardest hit by the foreclosure crisis.301 “Given that segregation concentrates the effects of any economic downturn spatially ... the rise in foreclosures hit black and Hispanic
neighborhoods with particular force.”302
Generally, foreclosure affects a consumer’s mobility and, of course, his or
her financial security.303 Segregation is furthered because the victims of the
crisis most likely need to live with family members, who often live in minority concentrated areas, to get their financial bearings.304 In areas in which
high numbers of foreclosures occurred, neighbors are also affected.305 Home
values decrease greatly.306 As home values decrease, equity is lost. Because
minorities’ net worth is closely tied to home equity,307 they are less able to
purchase outside of segregated areas. Consequently, the areas will likely remain depressed and, thus, predominantly minority.308
299

See, e.g., David Streitfeld & Gretchen Morgenson, Building Flawed American
Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at A1 (reporting that causes of the financial crisis was
due to “lax regulation, financial innovation gone awry, excessive debt, raw greed” and noting
the players in the crisis were: “bankers, borrowers, developers, politicians and bureaucrats.”).
300
Hyra et al., supra note 16, at 178 (arguing that already segregated minority communities are more susceptible to subprime lending because: (1) segregated communities are
“more isolated and may be less experienced with purchasing financial products”; (2) “mainstream, prime lenders might avoid segregated, low-income areas”; (3) subprime lenders
most likely target segregated areas with intense “marketing strategies”; and (4) “lenders
may place a higher risk-based premium for those living in low- and moderate-income,
segregated areas.”).
301
Patrick Bayer, Fernando Ferreira & Stephen Ross, The Vulnerability of Minority
Homeowners in the Housing Boom and Bust (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 19020, 2013).
302
See Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American
Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 630 (2010); see also Richard Rothstein, Discriminatory Mortgage Lending Intensifies Racial Segregation, THE ECONOMIC POLICY
INSTITUTE BLOG (Jan. 25, 2012, 1:24 PM), http://www.epi.org/publication/bp335-boa
-countrywide-discriminatory-lending/ (asserting that “[l]ongstanding federal inaction in the
face of widespread discriminatory mortgage lending practices helped create, and since has
perpetuated, racially segregated impoverished neighborhoods”).
303
Bocian et al., supra note 43, at 3.
304
Rugh & Massey, supra note 302, at 630–31.
305
Daniel Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of
Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 57,
57 (2006).
306
Id. at 58.
307
See supra Part IV.
308
See generally Myron Orfield, Segregation Is Still Wrong and Still Pervasive, THE
RACE POVERTY ENVIRONMENT, Fall 2008, at 62, available at http://perma.cc/7W98-PYAC.
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Segregation is harmful to everyone for several reasons. First, those
who are marginalized have an uphill climb in receiving academic and
occupational opportunities.309 Second, because poverty is more prevalent
in segregated predominantly-minority areas, crime is also more likely to
increase. According one scholar, “[l]ong-term racial and social isolation in
neighborhoods with high percentages of single parent families also leads
to the formation of gangs and other forms of ‘oppositional culture’ and a
form of linguistic isolation, which limits employment opportunities later in
life.”310 Third, members of society remain ignorant of each other’s backgrounds and experiences, making it difficult to have a democratic political
system that accurately represents the melting pot of America. Finally, the
economy cannot be carried by one segment of the population. Segregated
minority communities are generally impoverished. Like segregation, poverty becomes a generational condition.311 As a result, economic stability
becomes hard to maintain.
C. Slower Climb out of the Housing and Economic Crises
Although the Great Recession officially ended in 2009,312 there is
plenty of evidence that the recession will continue for many years. Elizabeth
Duke of the Federal Reserve Board acknowledged that “[t]he economy
normally has some self-correcting mechanisms ...”,313 which typically curtail a continued downward spiral of a housing market crisis. However,
Duke further noted that none of the self-correcting mechanisms have worked
in this recent crisis.314
Perhaps the self-correcting mechanisms, such as a drop in home prices
to increase the supply and demand,315 are unsuccessful because they do not
exactly get to the root of the cause of the crisis. Many are discounting the
fact that Caucasians, who have a high percentage of ownership with 73.4% in
309
Id. (noting that children from minority, low-income neighborhoods have many barriers to educational and occupational achievements).
310
Id.
311
Myron Orfield, Urban Schooling and the Perpetuation of Job Inequality in Metropolitan Chicago, in URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND JOB OPPORTUNITY 161, 162 (George E.
Peterson & Wayne Vroman eds., 1992) (focusing on Chicago’s labor market to demonstrate
lack of upward mobility in minority neighborhoods).
312
IRELAND, supra note 101, at 1 (defining the “Great Recession” as occurring between
the years 2007–2009).
313
Elizabeth Duke, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Federal
Reserve Board Policy Forum: The Housing Market Going Forward: Lessons Learned from
the Recent Crisis (Sept. 1, 2011), available at http://perma.cc/SY7Q-425X.
314
Id.
315
Id.
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the 4th quarter of 2013,316 have better access to the American Dream. On
the other hand, minorities, particularly African Americans and Latinos, have
been pushed out of the housing market by the meltdown.317 Furthermore, it
is estimated that minority populations will continue to grow and “will constitute 7 out of 10 net new household formations over the next decade.”318
Therefore, the biggest gains in homeownership demands are in minority
communities.319 Failing to open the doors for homeownership to these groups
will only serve to prolong the housing crisis.320
Hopefully, these opportunities will soon take shape to avoid this type of
economic crisis in the future. It is important to learn from past mistakes so
that we do not repeat them. The first step is to provide access to fair lending.
The goal, of course, should include: (1) implementation of policies that
reinforce homeownership for new minority homeowners; and (2) create
methods that entice would-be “boomerang” minority homeowners of all
communities back into the real estate market after foreclosure.
D. Re-Defining the American Dream
The American Dream has been a part of the fabric of the United States’
national identity for nearly a century.321 It is aspirational. The American
Dream typically includes the right and expectation to get married, have a
family, and buy a home.322 It involves the dogged determination that one can
accomplish any set goal.323 Even those on the lower rungs of the economic
ladder could dream of upward mobility by pulling themselves up by their
bootstraps.324
This latest downturn possibly tarnished the American Dream more than
any event in history. If it is true that the future generation learns from its preceding generation, then the future generation of minorities will likely believe that the American Dream has become too elusive. Thus, to these
316

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, supra note 13, at 9.
Bocian et al., supra note 43, at 6.
318
Carr, supra note 273, at 4.
319
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, supra note 13, at 9. African American and Latino homeownership rates are 43.1% and 45.3%, respectively. Id.
320
Id.
321
ADAMS, supra note 2, at 214–15.
322
SANDRA L. HANSON & JOHN KENNETH WHITE, The Making and Persistence of the
American Dream, in THE AMERICAN DREAM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 8, 9–10 (2011), available
at http://perma.cc/3AVG-DF4V.
323
See JIM CULLEN, THE AMERICAN DREAM: A SHORT STORY OF AN IDEA THAT SHAPED
A NATION 60 (2003).
324
Id.
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future Americans, the American Dream will remain just that—a dream—or
even a myth.
United States housing policies were supposed to make the American
Dream more attainable for those with limited economic opportunities. One
could argue that housing policies have worked to lift lower income Caucasians firmly into the middle class since the 1930s.325 However, housing
policies have done very little to elevate minorities.326 Moreover, the foreclosure and housing crisis has altered the definition of the American Dream.
Instead of being vehicles for advancement, U.S. housing policies became
means by which lenders pilfered the American Dream from some Americans who have historically struggled and who continue to fight for basic civil
rights. As John Truslow Adams wrote in 1931, “[e]quality of outcome ...
is not the same thing as equality of opportunity, and equality of opportunity
is at the heart of the American vision.”327
Although the laws are clear as to what constitutes discrimination, federal agencies failed to “mind the store” so that these laws could be enforced.
Prior to 2010, enforcement duties shared by numerous regulating agencies
were a bureaucratic nightmare.328 With so many “cooks in the kitchen,”
things were likely to get burned. Unfortunately, it was largely certain groups
of borrowers that were “burned” by lending discrimination. Even though
there were complaints of discriminatory practices or policies before 2009,
the agencies were slow to act or failed to act completely. It was reported that
the OCC brought four formal actions under the ECOA between 1987 and
July 2009, and made no referrals to the DOJ.329 The Office of Thrift Supervision did not make any referrals to the DOJ during this same period.330
Things changed when the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act was signed into law.331 The question remains whether DoddFrank and the subsequent regulations and actions are enough to prevent
another crisis and lending discrimination in the future.
325
Structural Racialization: A Systems Approach to Understanding the Causes and
Consequences of Racial Inequity, KIRWAN INSTITUTE (May 2012) at 2, available at http:
//perma.cc/TRU7-HTWC (pointing out the institutional racism of the Fair Housing
Administration’s Underwriting policies that favored white citizens while African Americans
were marginalized). The effects of these policies still reverberate today. Id.
326
Id. (observing that the modern day belief is that suburbs are havens for white
families, “rich with opportunity” while “racially segregated central cities are dangerously
lacking in opportunity”).
327
Meacham, supra note 4, at 6.
328
Aleatra P. Williams, Foreclosing Foreclosure: Escaping the Yawning Abyss of the
Deep Mortgage and Housing Crisis, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 455, 473–74 (2012).
329
Bocian et al., supra note 43, at 18.
330
Id. This was despite the fact that the DOJ filed a complaint against Mid America
Bank alleging a practice or patter of redlining in 2002. Id.
331
See infra Part IX.
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IX. MECHANISMS TO ERADICATE LENDING DISCRIMINATION
President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law on July 21, 2010.332 Title XIV of Dodd-Frank,
the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, modified the Truthin-Lending Act (TILA)333 “by setting forth prudent lending standards, consumer protections for both prime and subprime (high cost) mortgages,
mortgage servicing guidelines, appraisal requirements, and loan modification
/work-out procedures.”334
Historically, four major federal regulators and agencies oversaw mortgage lending and consumer protection.335 First, the U.S. Department of Housing and Development’s (HUD) mission was, and is, to “create strong,
sustainable, inclusive communities” and reinforce “the housing market to
bolster the economy and protect consumers.”336 HUD’s Office of Housing
oversees the Fair Housing Administration.337 Second, the Federal Reserve
Board’s (FRB) responsibilities included regulation of “banking institutions
to ensure the safety and soundness of the nation’s banking and financial systems to protect the credit rights of consumers.”338 One of the FRB’s expressed functions included administration of nationwide banking and credit
policies.339 Third, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) declared mission encompassed examination and supervision of financial
institutions for safety, soundness, and consumer protection.340 Finally, the
Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulated and supervised all
national banks and federal savings associations.341 The OCC’s goal involved
ensuring that the banks and the savings associations it regulated operated
“in a safe and sound manner and in compliance with laws requiring fair treatment of their customers and fair access to credit and financial products.”342
332

Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 STAT. 2136 (2010).
Truth in Lending Act § 129b, 15 U.S.C. § 1639b (2012).
334
Williams, supra note 328, at 503.
335
Id. at 474.
336
Id. (quoting Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., available at http://
perma.cc/HT29-9RAF (last visited Mar. 26, 2015)) (internal quotations omitted).
337
Id.
338
Id. (quoting The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. 1 (9th ed. 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/EQ2U-785A)
(internal quotations omitted).
339
Id.
340
Williams, supra note 328, at 474 (quoting FDIC Mission, Vision, and Values, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (May 4, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/4KP2-CN5V).
341
Id.
342
Id. (quoting About the OCC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
archived at http://perma.cc/7ZML-24GB) (internal quotations omitted).
333
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In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act343 created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to draft rules, and supervise and enforce federal
consumer protection laws.344 There are still collective enforcement duties
among the regulatory agencies, but creation of the CFPB streamlined enforcement of ECOA and FHA by theoretically cutting out some of the bureaucratic red tape that naturally existed between regulators with overlapping
responsibilities.345 Although many heralded the arrival of the CFPB, critics
complained that the CFPB’s power was both unfettered and undefined.346
A. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
The CFPB has several functions. The CFPB is imbued with the authority
to create, supervise, and enforce regulations concerning consumer financial
services and products.347 Among other things, the CFPB is empowered to
draft regulations that prohibit “unfair lending practices that promote disparities among consumers of equal credit worthiness but of different race,
ethnicity, gender, or age.”348
Additionally, the CFPB has the power to file civil actions to enforce the
ECOA on its own or refer fair lending abuses to the U.S. Attorney General.349
The Office of Administrative Adjudication (OAA), which is “an independent
judicial office,” is housed “within the [CFPB].”350 The OAA hears enforcement actions brought by the CFPB.351 The OAA’s administrative judges
343

Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 STAT. 2136 (2010).
Williams, supra note 328, at 475.
345
See The Economist, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Blessing or Bureaucracy, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 6, 2012, 7:57 PM), available at http://perma.cc/377J-XJDN;
Ammon Simon, Bureaucracy Unbound? The Consumer Protection Finance Bureau,
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Mar. 7, 2012, 4:35 PM), available at http://perma.cc/W34W
-G5AA (stating that the “CFPB lacks any significant checks and balances on its power to
interpret our country’s consumer-protection laws” and calling for reformation of the agency
so that its biased enforcement of consumer protection laws does not stifle economic
growth). Id.
346
The Economist, supra note 345.
347
15 U.S.C. § 1639b(e)(1)–(2) (2012).
348
15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(3)(C) (2012). The CFPB must confer with the applicable
prudential regulator or agency before proposing a rule or regulation. Id. § 1002 (24). Prudential regulators or agencies include the FDIC, OCC, FRB, and National Credit Union
Administration. Id.
349
15 U.S.C. § 1691e(g) (2012).
350
Administrative Adjudication, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumer
finance.gov/adminstrativeadjudication (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma
.cc/PF54-6UMG.
351
Id.
344
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follow the Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings,352 and publish
notices on the CFPB website to provide procedural guidance.353 The CFPB
pursued five actions in 2012, thirteen actions in 2013, and fifteen actions as
of October 2014 for its 2014 docket.354
Since its creation, the CFPB has tackled the enforcement of four major
residential mortgage laws. The CFPB has amended the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act,355 Home Disclosure Mortgage Act (HMDA),356 Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA),357 and Truth in Lending Act.358
Five of the enforcement actions brought by the CFPB as of July 2014 were
related to section 8 of RESPA.359
1. Amendment to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B)
Title 15 U.S.C. § 1691b authorizes the CFPB to impose regulations that
facilitate compliance and aid in carrying out the purposes of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act.360 Such action by the CFPB could include any adjustments
it deems appropriate and necessary to prevent the circumvention or evasion of the ECOA, as well as to facilitate compliance with the ECOA.361
Effective for applicants on or after January 18, 2014, the CFPB prescribed
352

Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 39,058 (June 29, 2012).
See Administrative Adjudication, supra note 350.
354
Id.
355
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)–(f) (1992).
356
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2810 (2012).
357
Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601-617 (2012); Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act, 24 C.F.R. § 3500 (2012).
358
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2012).
359
See, e.g., Paul Taylor et al., 2013 C.F.P.B. 0001 (2013), available at http://perma
.cc/9G38-9RHU (resulting in a consent order with disgorgement of over $118,000);
Fidelity Mortg. Corp. and Mark Figert, 2014 CFPB 0001 (2014), available at http://
perma.cc/6EGJ-2A24 (resulting in $54,000 civil monetary penalty to the Civil Penalty
Fund); PHH Corp. et al., 2014 C.F.P.B. 0002 (2014), available at http://perma.cc/8MR9
-CAKA (seeking a permanent injunction to prevent future violations of § 8 of RESPA,
disgorgement of money, restitution to borrowers, civil penalties, and prosecution costs);
1st Alliance Lending, LLC, 2014 CFPB 0003 (2014), available at http://perma.cc/H7ED
-BFLP (parties agreeing to a consent order of $83,000 civil monetary penalty payable to the
Civil Penalty Fund); JRHBW Realty, Inc., 2014 CFPB 0005 (2014), available at http://
perma.cc/TS4Q-6VJ9 (resulting in consent order with $500,000 civil penalty to the Civil
Penalty Fund); Stonebridge Title Serv., Inc., 2014 CFPB 0006 (2014), available at http://
perma.cc/7RH-7M9Z ($30,000 civil monetary penalty to the Civil Penalty Fund). The
above represent the enforcement actions filed before the OAA only. The CFPB filed other
actions in the Southern District Court of Florida as well. See, e.g., infra note 383.
360
15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2013).
361
15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a) (2013).
353
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the “Disclosure and Delivery Requirements for Copies of Appraisals and
Other Written Valuations under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B),”362 known as the “ECOA Valuations Rule.”
Under the ECOA Valuations Rule, creditors must comply with two main
requirements. First, creditors must disclose to applicants that they have the
right to receive copies of appraisals and all written valuations within three
business days.363 Second, the new rule mandates that creditors automatically
send free copies of home appraisal and written valuations to prospective borrowers as soon as such appraisals or valuations are finished.364 Creditors
must send the appraisal copies even if they decided not to extend credit or if
the applicant does not fully complete the credit application process or otherwise withdraws his or her credit application.365
The former Regulation B only compelled creditors to notify applicants
of their right to request a copy of appraisals and to provide copies of appraisals upon request by the applicant.366 The new Regulation B is broader
in scope than the former because it applies to all written valuations and not
only appraisals per the old rule.
The purpose of the ECOA is to bar discrimination based on prohibited
factors.367 As stated earlier, discrimination can arise at any stage in the home
purchase process.368 There is clear evidence that inflated or deflated home
appraisals played a significant role in the housing and foreclosure meltdown.369 It is apparent that the CFPB is concerned with appraisers or valuators who use prohibited discriminatory factors in assessing the value of a
residence in connection with an application for credit. Thus, the CFPB is further working to curtail discrimination at this stage in the lending process.
2. Amendment to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (Regulation C)
Mortgage lenders in metropolitan areas are required to “collect, report,
and disclose data about mortgage loan applications, originations, and purchases”370 for new home loans, refinances, or home improvement loans
362

Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B), 12 C.F.R. § 1002.14 (2014).
Id.
364
Id.
365
Id.
366
Id. The amendments to Regulation B are available at http://perma.cc/TD3D-75S7.
367
See supra Part II.B.
368
See supra Part II.B.
369
Kenneth R. Harney, Inflated Appraisals Swelling Mortgage-Fraud Schemes,
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 21, 2007, available at http://perma.cc/ULA8-LN7V.
370
12 U.S.C. §§ 2803(h) (2012).
363
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under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)371 and Regulation C.372
Among other things, the data disclosed must include information related to
the type of home loan, amount of the loan, location of the property, and the
race, ethnicity, income, and sex of the applicant.373 HMDA data collection
is used to alert enforcement agencies of “possible discriminatory lending
patterns and assist in the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws.”374 It
also aids enforcement agencies in assessing whether the financial institutions satisfy the housing needs of particular communities they service.375
The CFPB implemented new rules related to the data collected from 2014
onward.376 The agency modified the definition of “[f]inancial institution”
under Section 1003.2 to raise the asset-size exemption threshold to $43 million from $42 million, effective January 1, 2014.377 Therefore, this amendment exempts all “financial institutions” with assets under $43 million from
HMDA data collection for 2014.378
The CFPB recently sent an unequivocal message to all lending institutions covered under the HMDA of the importance of accurately reporting
the required data. For instance, the CFPB took action against Mortgage
Master, Inc.379 and Washington Federal380 for inaccurately providing information under the HMDA. The CFPB required Mortgage Master, Inc. to
pay $425,000 in civil penalties.381 Washington Federal had to pay $34,000
in civil penalties.382 The CFPB’s Director Richard Cordray reaffirmed the
importance of the data received under the HMDA. He said, “[w]hen financial institutions report inaccurate information, it obstructs the purpose of
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and makes it more difficult for the CFPB
371

Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (Regulation C), 12 C.F.R. § 1003 (2013).
12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–810 (2012); see also Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation
C): Adjustment to Asset-Size Exemption Threshold, 78 Fed. Reg. 79,285 (Dec. 30, 2013)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1003).
373
12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(2) (2012); see also Stephanie Caputo, The ABC’s of HMDA,
HMDA DATA AND LENDING OPPORTUNITIES (Summer 2005), available at http://perma
.cc/HWJ9-JYM7.
374
Caputo, supra note 373.
375
Id.
376
Id.
377
12 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (2012).
378
Id.
379
Mortgage Master, Inc., 2013 C.F.P.B. 0006 (2013), available at http://perma
.cc/PM9Z-U87B.
380
Washington Federal, 2013 C.F.P.B. 0005 (2013), available at http://perma
.cc/G3BG-BKYP.
381
Mortgage Master, Inc., 2013 C.F.P.B., at 0006.
382
Washington Federal, 2013 C.F.P.B., at 0005.
372
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to discover and stop discriminatory lending.”383 Cordray continued that the
Mortgage Master, Inc. and Washington Federal actions should serve as “a
strong signal that no lending institution—whether bank or nonbank—should
be able to mislead the public with erroneous data.”384
3. Amendment to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(Regulation X)
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)385 protects consumers by requiring lenders, mortgage servicers, or brokers to disclose
mortgage settlement costs and barring certain uses of escrow accounts and
kickbacks.386 In 2010, Dodd-Frank transformed RESPA and other mortgage servicing procedures. The CFPB made both technical and substantive
modifications to Regulation X, effective January 10, 2014.387 These amendments included notice requirements regarding servicing transfers and added
notice measures pertaining to borrowers’ error resolution services and requests for information.388 Other new provisions included “escrow payments,
force-placed insurance, general servicing policies, procedures, and requirements, early intervention, continuity of contact, and loss mitigation.”389
Kickbacks unnecessarily increased costs of mortgagors for mortgagors during the foreclosure crisis.390 The CFPB has taken steps to eradicate kickbacks by pursuing enforcement actions against lenders, mortgage brokers,
and mortgage servicers.391
383
CFPB Takes Action Against Nonbank & Bank for Inaccurate Mortgage Loan
Reporting, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc
/GE2W-N29E.
384
Id.
385
12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2012).
386
FED. RESERVE BD., Regulation X: Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, CONSUMER
COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK (Nov. 2013), available at http://perma.cc/5XZ2-946K.
387
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 C.F.R. § 1024 (2012).
388
Id.
389
Consumer Affairs Letter, Regulation X: Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act,
FED. RESERVE BD., available at http://perma.cc/NNH6-NBD9.
390
Kenneth R. Harney, Alleged Kickbacks Paid by Home Buyers Get Attention from
Federal Agency, WASH. POST, May 31, 2013, available at http://perma.cc/AN2J-WUV9.
391
See Administrative Adjudication, supra note 350. See also Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau v. Genworth Mortg. Ins. Corp., 1:13 cv 21183 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (consent order resulting in $4.5 million in civil penalty); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Mortg. Guaranty Ins.
Corp., 1:13 cv 21187 (S.D. Fla. 2013) ($2,650,000 civil penalty); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau
v. Radian Guaranty Inc., 1:13 cv 21188 (S.D. Fla. 2013) ($3,750,000 civil penalty); Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. United Guaranty Corp., 1:13 cv 21189 (S.D. Fla. 2013) ($4,500,000
civil penalty).
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4. Amendment to the Truth in Lending Act (Ability-To-Repay Rule)
(Regulation Z)
One of the most significant rules by the CFPB is the amendment of
Regulation Z,392 which took effect on January 10, 2014.393 The “Abilityto-Repay Rule” implements the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and sections
1411–1412, 1414 of Dodd-Frank.394 This rule is designed to right the wrongs
of the recent mortgage crisis.395 The Ability-to-Repay Rule expands the
2008 revisions of Regulation Z by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB).396
The FRB’s rule prohibited lending higher-priced loans to borrowers without
consideration of the consumer’s ability to repay the debt.397 In addition to
expanding the FRB’s rule, the CFPB amendment of Regulation Z creates
and clarifies standards for Dodd-Frank’s new class of mortgages, “Qualified
Mortgages” (QMs).398
The FRB’s revision only set forth standards for higher-priced mortgages, not prime mortgages.399 Higher-priced mortgages were defined as:
Consumer-purpose, closed-end loans secured by a consumer’s principal
dwelling and having an annual percentage rate (APR) that exceeds the
average prime offer rates for a comparable transaction published by the
Board by at least 1.5 percentage points for first-lien loans, or 3.5 percentage points for subordinate lien loans.400

The FRB set up four requirements for lenders related to these loans. First,
lenders were compelled to take into account a consumer’s ability to repay
392

Ability-to-Repay & Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in Lending Act
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6,408 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026)
[hereinafter Ability-to-Repay].
393
Mortgage Rules, What the New CFPB Mortgage Rules Mean for Families and
Homeowners, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, available at http://perma.cc/5FW9-GVKC.
394
Ability-to-Repay, supra note 392, at 6,408.
395
Id. (noting that a large number of mortgages were made without considering borrowers’ ability to repay and/or through loose underwriting standards). One of Dodd-Frank’s
objectives was to standardize loan products. The hope was that consumer protection
would be the byproduct of this standardization. See Tanya D. Marsh, Statement Before
the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: Regulatory Burdens: The
Impact of Dodd Frank on Community Banking (July 18, 2013), available at http://perma
.cc/UC6Q-S3AM.
396
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (2008).
397
Id.
398
Ability-to-Repay, supra note 392, at 6,408.
399
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), supra note 396, at 44,522.
400
Id. at 44,522–23.
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from sources other than collateral.401 Second, prepayment penalties were not
allowed except under certain circumstances.402 Third, creditors were required
to verify borrowers’ income and assets.403 Fourth, creditors were required
to set up escrow accounts for taxes and insurance, which could be canceled
one year after the loan was consummated.404
Under Dodd-Frank, QMs are mortgages underwritten to match specific
federal law standards; they indicate that a creditor has taken into account
reasonable underwriting factors in the extension of credit.405 The CFPB’s
amendments set forth minimum underwriting standards with which a lender
must comply. The following are the eight factors that a lender must take
into account:
(1) Current or reasonably expected income or assets; (2) current employment status; (3) the monthly payment on the covered transaction;
(4) the monthly payment on any simultaneous loan; (5) the monthly
payment for mortgage-related obligations; (6) current debt obligations,
alimony, and child support; (7) the monthly debt-to-income ratio or residual income; and (8) credit history.406

To further ensure responsible underwriting, the revision requires lenders
to “generally use reasonably reliable third-party records to verify the information they use to evaluate the factors.”407
Each mortgagor must have the ability to repay the mortgage, which
means that the borrower must have a debt to income ratio of 43% or less.408
The QM standard requires that a lender compute a borrower’s monthly payments “based on the highest payment that will apply in the first five years
of the loan” in addition to debt to income ratio requirement.409 In addition,
lenders cannot charge high points or fees. For example, for a loan of
$100,000, a lender cannot charge points or fees greater than 3%.410 Additionally, mortgagees are prohibited from steering borrowers into higher cost
mortgages.411 Further, the loan cannot have features that are deemed “risky”,
401

Id. at 44,523.
Id.
403
Id.
404
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), supra note 396, at 44,523.
405
Lisa Prevost, “Qualified” Loans, Redefined, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2013, at RE10.
406
Ability-to-Repay, supra note 392, at 6408.
407
Id.
408
Id. at 6409
409
Id.
410
Id.; see also CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, MORTGAGE RULES: WHAT
THE NEW CFPB MORTGAGE RULES MEAN FOR FAMILIES AND HOMEOWNERS, available at
http://perma.cc/9X42-FHH6.
411
Ability-to-Repay, supra note 392, at 6432.
402
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such as negative amortization, interest only, stated-income loans, or loans
lasting longer than thirty years.412
The CFPB clarifies that a safe harbor exists for a lender. If a lender
satisfies the criteria for QMs and the loan is not a higher-priced loan as defined by the FRB 2008 modification, then there is a conclusive presumption that the lender made a reasonable determination of the borrower’s
ability to repay and acted in good faith.413 This provides lenders with safe
harbors against liability from consumers.414
Regarding subprime or higher-priced loans, a rebuttable presumption
against liability may be created if a lender satisfies the QM criteria.415 However, a borrower may have present grounds for rebutting the presumption.416
To rebut the presumption, or show a violation regarding the subprime QM, a
borrower can present evidence that “at the time the loan was originated, the
[borrower’s] income and debt obligations left insufficient residual income or
assets to meet living expenses.”417 On review, the appropriate entity would
take into account the borrower’s “monthly payments on the loan, loan-related
obligations, and any simultaneous loans of which the creditor was aware, as
well as any recurring, material living expenses of which the creditor was
aware.”418 The longer amount of time that a borrower has made timely payments without modification or accommodation, the less likely a borrower
may rebut the presumption.419
It appears that the CFPB fully understands that these modifications
may make lenders apprehensive to extend credit. The CFPB has stated, “[i]n
light of the fragile state of the mortgage market as a result of the recent mortgage crisis, however, the Bureau is concerned that creditors may initially be
reluctant to make loans that are not qualified mortgages, even though they
are responsibly underwritten.”420 To allow lenders to somewhat temporarily
bypass the standards, the CFPB created a second category of QMs. To be a
QM, a lender must either: (1) satisfy the QM standards; or (2) meet the underwriting standards, making it eligible to be purchased, guaranteed, or insured
by either: (a) Government Sponsored Enterprises, Fannie Mae, or Freddie
Mac, while they were under federal conservatorship (or issue their own
underwriting standards); or (b) HUD, Veterans Affairs, Department of
412

Id. at 6409.
Id.
414
Id.
415
Id. at 6408.
416
Id. at 6408–09.
417
Id. at 6409.
418
Id.
419
Id.
420
Id.
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Agriculture, or Rural Housing Service.421 This second category of QMs
will only be available for seven years.422
A borrower has three years after an alleged violation to pursue a legal
action against a lender.423 Successful plaintiffs are entitled to damages up
to all paid finance charges and fees, plus other actual damages, costs, and
attorney’s fees.424 Performing a prohibited act would serve as a defense
against foreclosure if the act constitutes a breach of the Ability-to-Repay
requirement.425
Some authors have expressed concerns that the Ability-to-Repay standard
is too stringent and will keep the credit market restrictive in its lending.426
Of particular concern is the requirement that borrowers must have a debt to
income ratio no greater than 43%, irrespective of credit score, to be deemed a
“qualified mortgage.”427 Debts taken into account in calculating the debt to
income ratio are property taxes, student loans, and points or fees associated
with the home sale.428 It has also been argued that the amended rules “shifted
accountability for loans from borrowers to lenders.”429
It has yet to be seen whether the Ability-to-Repay Rule will cause
more harm than good. The real estate market is still struggling to survive
and is currently on life support.430 Tightened credit may prolong the need
for life support or cause the whole system to crash.
The rule could possibly injure both homebuyers and some creditors.431
Prospective homebuyers may be harmed if they have student loans. The
Ability-to-Repay Rule now includes student loan debt in the calculation of

421

Id.
Id.
423
Id. at 6422; see also Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013)
(affirming that mere notice is sufficient and that a borrower must file suit within three
years to invoke the rescission provision of Regulation Z).
424
Ability-to-Repay, supra note 392, at 6416.
425
Id.
426
See, e.g., Richard Satran, Fewer Easy Mortgages Under U.S. Consumer Agency Rule,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 20, 2013.
427
Id. (reporting that some mortgagors might be able to afford a mortgage with an even
higher household debt ratio).
428
Id.
429
Diane Katz, Dodd-Frank Mortgage Rules Unleash Predatory Regulators, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013
/12/doddfrank-mortgage-rules-unleash-predatory-regulators#_ftn21, archived at http://
perma.cc/75AV-KJCX.
430
Satran, supra note 426.
431
Id.; Katz, supra note 429.
422
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debt ratio.432 Additionally, verification of employment history might be problematic as a result of the crisis.433 Further, homeowners might be unable to
refinance their homes if their household debt is more than 43% of their
income.434 Also, potential homebuyers in high-priced real estate markets,
like California, would have difficulty qualifying for a home loan.435 The
overall concern is access to affordable housing.
The new rule might be more burdensome for minorities, specifically,
in three ways. First, as discussed previously, African American and Latino
groups generally do not have economic parity in terms of personal net
worth.436 Consequently, African Americans and Latinos graduate with more
student loan debt compared to Caucasian bachelor degree holders.437 One
report stated that 40% of Latinos, and 51% of African Americans, borrowed
money for college, compared to 43% of Caucasians.438 The estimation is that
“27 percent of black bachelor’s degree holders had more than $30,500 in
loans, compared with 16 percent of white bachelor’s degree holders.”439
Moreover, “81 percent of non-Hispanic black students and 67 percent of
Hispanic students left school with higher debt compared to non-Hispanic
white classmates.”440 Second, the new Ability-to-Repay Rule may make it
difficult for minorities, particularly African Americans and Latinos, to incur
student loan debt for any degree level and attain homeownership in the future.
The rule may force minorities to select which part of the American Dream
432

Student loan debt was historically excluded from the income–debt ratio, but the
Ability-to-Repay Rule modified the ability to repay formula to include this debt. Satran,
supra note 426.
433
Id.
434
Id.
435
Id.
436
Rakesh Kochkar, Richard Fray, & Paul Taylor, Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs
Between Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jul. 26, 2011), http://www
.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-between-whites-blacks
-hispanics/, archived at http://perma.cc/T77E-QVB8.
437
Equal Justice Works, How Student Debts Affects Women, Minorities, THE STUDENT
LOAN RANGER (May 1, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student
-loan-ranger/2013/05/01/how-student-debt-affects-women-minorities, archived at http://
perma.cc/6HMP-L5TP; Minority Students Are Saddled School Loan Debt, THE NATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL, Jan. 30, 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/thenextamerica/education
/minority-students-are-saddled-by-school-loan-debt-20130130, archived at http://perma.cc
/9FYP-JLTQ.
438
Isaac Juarez, Minority Students Have More Student Loan Debt, LOANS.ORG
(Nov. 2, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://loans.org/student/news/minorities-have-more-debt-92467,
archived at http://perma.cc/GBQ3-UFWS.
439
Equal Justice Works, supra note 437.
440
Juarez, supra note 438.
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they wish to obtain—education or homeownership. Third, minority graduates
with higher levels of student loan debt often earn less than their non-minority
counterparts do. Many African American college graduates are underemployed, taking jobs that do not require college degrees.441 The Center for
Economic and Policy Research conducted a study that found that “56 percent
of Black college graduates were in an occupation that didn’t require a degree
in 2013.”442 With lower incomes and higher debts, minority prospective
homebuyers may be severely limited in how much they can borrow for a
home mortgage and where they buy under the new Ability-to-Repay Rule.
Similarly, the new rules would harm lenders because they potentially
make the lending process costlier. Smaller banks, in particular, may not be
technologically equipped to meet the demands of these new standards. Creditors may have to “reconfigure policies and procedures, reprogram loan
origination systems, and retrain personnel—thereby increasing the costs of
underwriting loans.”443 If smaller banks do not have the resources to comply
with the new requirements, then it is quite possible that many would be
driven out of the market. On the other hand, those with the resources to
comply with the standards will be skittish in extending credit.444
The credit market is currently tight445 and might remain so for a while.
The CFPB acknowledged that rules might need tweaking in the future and
promised to keep an eye on the housing market and make adjustments if
necessary.446 Furthermore, the rules do not prohibit lenders from offering
non-qualified mortgages. Lenders have the autonomy to do so, but if they
do, then the risk of liability that a consumer did not have the ability to repay
the loan at origination is on the lender.
441

Taylor Gordon, Majority of Recent Black Graduates Face Underemployment in Weak
Labor Market, ATLANTA BLACK STAR (May 21, 2014).
442
Id.
443
Katz, supra note 429.
444
Id.; see also Satran, supra note 426 (quoting the Mortgage Bankers Association’s
estimation that mortgages are at least “eight times as difficult to get now than when they
were in years prior to the housing collapse”).
445
Satran, supra note 426; Greg Robb, Banks Keeping Mortgage Standards Tight,
MARKETWATCH (May 5, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/banks-keep
ing-mortgage-standards-tight-2014-05-05, archived at http://perma.cc/XX89-EYGJ; Octavio
Nuiry, How Tight Credit is Putting the Squeeze on Housing, REALTYTRAC (Apr. 17,
2014), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/news-and-opinion/how-tight-credit-is-putting-the
-squeeze-on-housing-8039, archived at http://perma.cc/L4BZ-SRRA;Margaret Chadbourn,
New U.S. Housing Regulator Hears Concerns on Tight Credit, REUTERS.COM (Feb. 19,
2014, 11:36 PM), http://uk.mobile.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstate
News/idUKL2N0LO1XA20140219, archived at http://perma.cc/6PZK-BRNT.
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Satran, supra note 426.
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B. U.S. Department of Justice
The DOJ is composed of multiple agencies or departments.447 The Civil
Rights Division of the DOJ is authorized with enforcement duties concerning
both the FHA448 and ECOA.449 The newly created Fair Lending Unit was
created in response to the rampant discriminatory lending practices during the
housing and foreclosure crisis.450
The DOJ is given extensive authority to bring an action against lenders
engaged in patterns or practices of unlawful discrimination.451 Also, the
CFPB, HUD, FRB, OCC, Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), FDIC, and National Credit Unit Administration may also
refer matters concerning patterns or practices of illegal discrimination452 to
the DOJ.453 Between 2009 and 2011, the FTC and HUD referred 109 matters
to the DOJ.454
Referrals must be accepted for an enforcement action by the DOJ. For a
referral to be accepted, all of the following criteria must exist. First, there
must be a serious pattern related to “either financial or emotional harm to
members of protected classes.”455 Second, court action is necessary to halt the
447

Department of Justice Agencies, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/agen
cies/index-list.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/H44R-LXRV.
448
Civil Rights Division Housing Enforcement Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http:
//www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc
/B9Y4-42EH.
449
Id.
450
The Fair Lending Unit was created in early 2010 with the expressed goal to make
fair lending a “top priority.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV.
2011 FAIR LENDING ACCOMPLISHMENTS, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents
/fairlending.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9GCB-MNAL.
451
15 U.S.C. § 1691e(h) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (2012).
452
According the DOJ, a regulatory agency “need not have overwhelming proof of an
extensive pattern or practice of discrimination” before referring a matter to the DOJ. U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IDENTIFYING LENDING PRACTICES THAT MAY FORM THE BASIS OF A
PATTERN OR PRACTICE REFERRAL TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1996), available at
http://perma.cc/RFA2-TMLS. However, before the DOJ files a lawsuit under the ECOA
or FHA, “the Attorney General [must] have a reasonable belief that a pattern or practice
of discrimination exists.” Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(h) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (a)
(2012).
453
THOMAS E. PEREZ, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2011), available at http://perma
.cc/V8T4-UR76 [hereinafter PEREZ, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT].
454
THOMAS E. PEREZ, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (2012), available at http://
perma.cc/E7NM-9MAJ [hereinafter PEREZ, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT].
455
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 452.
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practice.456 Third, the “protected class members harmed by the practice cannot be fully compensated without court action.”457 Fourth, damages “beyond
out-of-pocket losses, are necessary to defer the lender (or others like it) from
treating the cost of detection as a cost of doing business.”458 Fifth, “[t]he
agency believes the practice to be sufficiently common in the lending industry, or raises an important issue, so as to require its public disclosure as a
deterrent to other lenders.”459 Fifty-five out of 109 of the referred matters
from 2009 to 2011 concerned lending discrimination based on race or
national origin.460
In its 2010 Report to Congress, the Civil Rights Division reported that
its main mission was “to address the wide range of discriminatory practices
by lenders, brokers, and other players in the mortgage market that contributed
to our nation’s housing crisis and economic meltdown.”461 Regulatory agencies referred forty-nine matters of practice or patterns of discrimination to
the DOJ and opened over sixty matters for investigation.462 The Fair Lending
Unit brought its first major discriminatory lending enforcement action in
2010 in United States. v. AIG Federal Savings Bank et al.463
In United States v. AIG Federal Savings Bank et al., the Civil Rights Division simultaneously filed and settled an action alleging that AIG Federal
Savings Bank (AIG) had violated the ECOA and FHA by charging higher
fees associated with wholesale loans to African Americans from July 2003
through May 2006.464 The complaint also alleged that AIG failed to supervise or monitor mortgage brokers’ fees.465 The settlement included provisions requiring AIG to pay $2 million to borrowers who were harmed by the
practice and “to have in place loan pricing policies, monitoring and employee training that ensure discrimination does not occur in the future.”466
The year 2011 was a banner year for enforcement actions brought by the
Civil Rights Division. The Fair Lending Unit filed eight lawsuits and reached

456

Id.
Id.
458
Id.
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Id.
460
PEREZ, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 454. The referral numbers greatly increased
during these years. Only thirty racial and national origin mortgage discrimination matters
were referred to the DOJ from 2001 through 2008. Id.
461
PEREZ, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 453.
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Id. This was more referrals than had been received in more than twenty years. Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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settlements totaling $350 million.467 The enforcement actions brought by the
DOJ related to redlining, pricing discrimination, and fair lending discrimination.468 The DOJ settled its landmark discrimination case, the largest lending discrimination settlement in DOJ history, United States v. Countrywide
Financial Corporation, for $335 million in December of 2011.469 The
DOJ stated, “[n]o one case can rectify the multitude of unlawful practices in
the housing and lending market that contributed to the nationwide housing
and foreclosure crisis, but the Division’s fair lending work represents an important piece of the Department’s comprehensive efforts to address it.”470
In 2012, the DOJ received a referral, filed, and settled a practice and
pattern action against Wells Fargo, NA, alleging that Wells Fargo had steered
African Americans and Latinos into subprime mortgages and charged higher
fees and rates to these groups from 2004 to 2009.471 Wells Fargo agreed to
pay $184.25 million in compensation to borrowers and to provide $50
million in direct down payment assistance to communities hurt by the housing crisis and Wells Fargo’s discrimination.472 Additionally, two discrimination suits were filed and settled against SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.,473 and
GFI Mortgage Bankers.474 SunTrust agreed to pay $21 million to their borrower victims and was required to maintain specific policies on pricing
and fair lending monitoring at least for three years. GFI was compelled “to
pay $3.5 million in compensation to approximately 600 African-American
and Hispanic GFI borrowers, the largest per-victim recovery in a Department of Justice pricing case, and to pay the government the maximum
$55,000 civil penalty allowed by the Fair Housing Act.”475 Under the consent
order, the DOJ also required GFI to create policies similar to SunTrust’s.476
The DOJ finished 2012 with nine open fair lending investigations and three
authorized civil actions.477
467
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C. Federal Reserve Board
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is “responsible
for implementing various federal laws intended to protect and inform consumers in credit and other financial service transactions, ensuring that consumers receive comprehensive information and fair treatment in these
transactions, and promoting economic development and community lending in historically underserved areas.”478 The FRB supervises member banks.
For banks with assets greater than $10 billion, the FRB has supervisory
authority to ensure compliance with the Fair Housing Act.479 However, the
CFPB has supervisory authority to ensure compliance with the ECOA.480
For banks with less than $10 billion in assets, the FRB has supervisory authority for compliance to both the FHA and ECOA.481
The FRB has the authority to remedy a fair lending violation on its own
so long as the actions do not constitute a pattern or practice of discrimination.482 To resolve these actions, the FRB may use “informal supervisory
tools (such as memoranda of understanding between banks’ boards of directors and the Reserve Banks, or board resolutions) to ensure that violations
are corrected. If necessary to protect consumers, however, the Board can
bring public enforcement actions.”483
D. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development
The Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity within HUD is responsible for overseeing and enforcing federal laws and setting “national
policies that make sure all Americans have equal access to the housing of
their choice.”484 The laws enforced by HUD include the Fair Housing Act
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, inter alia.485
478
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HUD reviews housing discrimination complaints and determines whether
it will issue a charge of discrimination.486 If HUD issues a charge of discrimination, it will schedule an administrative action.487 At this point, either
HUD or the defendant may opt to transfer the action to federal court.488 Once
either party elects federal court, the DOJ will pursue the matter further.489
X. ANOTHER REMEDY: CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND SANCTIONS
The typical remedy for violating the FHA and the ECOA is monetary
penalties under civil law. However, the victims of the violation might be too
numerous to obtain full satisfaction for the harm inflicted. Pursuant to the
multi-million dollar settlements, mortgagors were entitled to receive their
money mortgage payments up to the date of foreclosure.490 Depending on the
settlement amount and number of claimants, a victim may not receive the
full compensatory amount. Further, loss of equity is not taken into account.
Moreover, the possibility of civil liability becomes a cost of doing business
for lenders. However, those costs may have already been imposed on the victims or future consumers.
On the other hand, criminal law enforcement and sanctions have three
aims: (1) keep order and protect society;491 (2) deter certain types of behavior;492 and (3) exact retribution from the wrongdoer on behalf of its
victim.493 For lending discrimination, this might serve as a great deterrent in
the future, but the lending discrimination laws do not permit this remedy.
For tax fraud, prosecutors consider the nature and seriousness of the fraud
by taking into account numerous factors including, but not limited to: (1) the
magnitude of the loss;494 (2) “[w]hether the loss stems from multiple tax
486
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types”;495 (3) the length of time the loss persisted or number of taxpayers
involved;496 (4) whether the conduct of the wrongdoer was intertwined “with
other fraud or illegality”;497 and (5) the reasons for the fraud and degree of
corruption.498
It would not be too great of a leap to apply criminal sanctions to the
mortgage lending arena. Criminal prosecution is already available in
mortprocessgage fraud cases.499 Many mortgage fraud cases result in both
restitution and prison sentences.500
Lenders, brokers, or anyone who discriminates during the lending process, especially to the scale as seen in the housing and foreclosure crisis,
should be subjected to prison sentences. The aims of the criminal code will
be accomplished. First, society will be protected by not being subject to
lending discrimination. Second, criminal prosecution would send a very clear
message to lenders (and others) that lending discrimination is reprehensible and will not be tolerated. Third, the victims would likewise be entitled
to retribution.
The vastitude of the losses experienced because of lending discrimination is immeasurable. This type of remedy would pack a greater punch than
civil damages only. Criminal prosecution pierces the ivory tower and places
the reality of the losses on the rightful party, the lending discrimination
perpetrator. The threat of criminal prosecution incentivizes the would-be
lending discriminator to curb the discriminatory behavior before it occurs.
Thus, there would be minimal need to traverse the bureaucratic red tape that
currently exists for fair mortgage lending.
CONCLUSION
Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez of the Department of Justice said:
The promise of equal opportunity represents the foundation of the
American dream—from the opportunity to learn, to the opportunity to
495
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earn, to the opportunity to gain fair access to credit, to live where one
chooses and move up the economic ladder—and homeownership has
been its most basic building block.501

However, minorities, who have historically been the victims of mortgage
discrimination, are still battling for equal opportunities for fair mortgage
lending and homeownership in the 21st Century.
Although the laws that prohibit discrimination have been in place for
over forty years, minorities—particularly Latinos and African Americans—
are waiting to receive fair access to credit and thence homeownership in
areas of their choosing. Forty years into this unalleviated battle for a basic
civil right, there exists ample evidence of patterns of racial inequality, which
create a legacy of economic inequality.
The mortgage lending process is multifaceted; it contains numerous
stages and multiple factors are considered. Ideally, lenders look at a borrower’s creditworthiness and other factors related to his or her ability to pay
as opposed to skin color, ethnicity, or the area where the borrower lives.
Lending discrimination affects all people, regardless of color or creditworthiness. None are safe from the fallout of lending discrimination. Banks,
homeowners, their neighbors, cities, and ultimately, the national economy are
all hurt by systemic defects in the lending process. Unfair lending practices
lead to foreclosures, which, in turn, lead to blight and loss of tax revenues.502
The U.S. government after many years of inaction has stepped up to
address lending discrimination by filing suit against lenders who exhibited
patterns of disparate treatment or whose policies have a disparate impact
on a protected group. These lawsuits financially stung large banks that allegedly engaged in patterns or practices of discrimination. Hopefully, civil
liability will serve as some deterrent to lenders in the future. However, in
addition to civil liability, statutes should be amended to allow the Department of Justice, or other federal regulatory agencies, to pursue criminal prosecution in the most egregious cases as well. Criminal liability will serve as the
ultimate deterrent, the “teeth”, and will ensure that non-discriminatory behavior drives out discriminatory behavior in the consumer credit market.503
Likewise, the new servicing rules should provide sufficient and uniform
guidelines for lenders. However, the concern with these rules is that gaps
in homeownership rates will grow even wider. Missing from the equation in
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this lending discrimination reformation step by the CFPB (and other regulatory agencies charged with consumer protection) is the fact that some minorities start with other economic inequalities due to lack of equal access
to education or employment.504 Accordingly, servicing guidelines should
restrict lending discrimination by providing a mechanism for enforcement,
but also take into account that the goal of fair access to affordable housing
for all Americans regardless of race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, familial
status, religion, or disability. This requires an acknowledgement of the persistent financial inequalities that exist separate from the housing market.
Additionally, more effort must be taken to educate the public on credit,
its products, and what constitutes lending discrimination. There are many
who do not understand that they are in a situation of mortgage discrimination
until things go terribly wrong, such as delinquencies or foreclosures. Because
discrimination may occur at any stage of the lending process, not just during
the end stage, borrowers need to be more aware so that prompt action may
take place.
It is for the betterment of society to eradicate all forms of discrimination, whether it is related to lending or otherwise. Hopefully, lending reformation efforts will make the lending process color blind, help heal the real
estate market by opening (or re-opening) the door of homeownership to the
segments of the population currently locked out, and bridge gaps in wealth
accumulation among all Americans. The uphill struggle by regulators and
agencies must carry on until minority homeownership rates more closely
mirror those of non-minorities. It is time to break the shackles of discrimination and allow qualified borrowers to receive non-discriminatory terms in
all credit transactions, including mortgage financing. Only then can we can
truly label the American Dream, the American Dream.
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